




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Endogenous ballot structures: The selection of open and closed lists in Colombia's legislative elections[☆]

Susan Achury, Margarita Ramírez, Francisco Cantú^{*}

University of Houston, United States

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ABSTRACT

What are the incentives for parties to personalize electoral competition? This paper proposes that both open and closed lists give congruity, rather than tension, to the interests of party leaders and candidates. However, the efficacy of each list type depends on the electoral returns expected from promoting the partisan and personal vote. To test this argument, we analyze the choices of parties over the ballot structure by leveraging an unusual institutional feature of the Colombian legislative elections, wherein parties are allowed to present either an open or a closed list, varying their choices across electoral districts and contests. Our empirical analysis shows that parties are more likely to open their lists in high-magnitude districts and wherever they have a strong, local electoral organization. We also find a positive relationship between the selection of closed lists among personalist parties, providing evidence to previous arguments proposing a closed list as a tool to concentrate campaign efforts behind a particular candidate.

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1. Introduction

Since the work of Carey and Shugart (1995), scholars have revisited the ways open and closed lists shape the connection between voters and candidates.¹ The literature offers two general premises. Open lists—wherein voters are allowed to express their preferences for individual candidates—encourage personal representation, since voters can decide among those candidates that better embody their interests (Cain et al., 1987; Colomer, 2011). By contrast, closed lists—wherein voters express only their preferences among parties—foster partisan representation because the voter's intention to punish or reward individuals on the ballot is spread across all of the candidates in the party's list (Carey, 2009, p. 71). As a result, the ballot structure defines not only the way voters express their preferences but also the incentives for politicians to promote either the party label or the personal characteristics of the candidates.

The apparent tension between the personal and party vote-seeking incentives puts parties in a dilemma. On the one hand, party leaders would prefer to promote the party label by keeping both personal campaigns and intra-party competition at a minimum. On the other hand, parties' goals ultimately depend on their electoral success (Budge and Laver, 1986, p. 490), which can be boosted by tolerating internal disagreement among co-partisans (Blumenau et al., Forthcoming) and encouraging the candidates' individual efforts (Pachón and Shugart, 2010; Bergman et al., 2013). Given these competing goals, this study poses the following question: Under what conditions are parties more likely to promote (or constrain) the personal vote-seeking incentives?

To address this question, we explore the preferences of parties over the ballot structure in Colombia's last three legislative elections. We choose this case to exploit an unusual feature in its electoral rules, which affords parties the opportunity to present either an open or closed list, allowing their choices to vary across electoral districts and contests.² Considering the different choices

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^{*} Corresponding author.

E-mail addresses: sachury@uh.edu (S. Achury), mmramirezrubio@uh.edu (M. Ramírez), fcantu10@uh.edu (F. Cantú).

¹ See, for example, Gaines (1998); Crisp et al. (2004); Shugart et al. (2005); Edwards and Thames (2007); Colomer (2011); Martin (2011); Bergman et al. (2013).

² The scenario most similar to our case study is the electoral system in Denmark, where each party makes a choice between two ballot structures: open and semi-closed list. For our research question, Colombian elections diverge from the Danish case in two aspects. First, parties in Denmark are not allowed to compete with a fully closed list; the semi-closed alternative still allows voters to cast a personal vote for any of the candidates in the list. Second, semi-closed lists are rarely chosen (they represented only six percent of all lists in 2001). For more details, see Elklit (2005).

in every election, and taking advantage of the institutional variety across parties and electoral districts, we investigate the conditions in which the campaign incentives of party leaders and candidates are more likely to overlap.

Akin to the “sweet spot” that some electoral systems have found in the tradeoff between representation and accountability (Carey and Hix, 2011), we propose that both open and closed lists can harmonize, rather than confront, the vote-seeking incentives of parties and candidates. However, the way in which each list type coordinates both goals depends substantially upon the contextual conditions of the political actors. In particular, closed lists align the incentives of parties and candidates in cases in which the expected returns of promoting the party label are unbalanced with those of highlighting the personal image of their candidates. By contrast, open lists are a useful device for parties whose candidates’ gains from emphasizing their personal traits are relatively similar to those from promoting the party label.

This paper complements recent works on the parties’ electoral strategies when voters are allowed to choose between candidates and party lists (André et al., 2012; Blumenau et al., Forthcoming; Hangartner et al., 2016). In particular, we take the ballot structure as the dependent variable and explore how parties anticipate the determinants of personal and partisan representation in three ways. First, our findings provide evidence that parties competing in high-magnitude districts compete in open lists to promote their party label and candidates’ personal attributes in a simultaneous way. While open lists in large districts foster the personal vote-seeking incentives, large districts also dilute the personal connection between voters and candidates, increasing the value of the party label as a useful cue to voters. Conversely, parties competing in low-magnitude districts are more likely to compete in closed lists. Since small districts decrease the collective benefits of pooling votes among list members, parties prefer to run under a closed ballot insofar as it aligns the partisan and individual efforts of candidates within a list. This finding follows recent literature distinguishing the incentives for personal voting under different institutional environments (Nemoto and Shugart, 2013; Bergman et al., 2013; Renwick and Pilet, 2016; André et al., 2016).

Second, the results help us understand how the ballot structure harmonizes the interests of party leadership and candidates. We find that parties are more likely to present closed lists in those districts where their local sub-units are electorally weak. Local sub-units with a strong electoral organization use open lists to exploit the personal connections between their local agents and voters. In contrast, sub-units with poor null electoral organization use closed lists as a way to compensate for their poor electoral capacity with the promotion of the partisan brand. The finding draws inspiration from existing work regarding the importance of local party sub-units to define party discipline and legislative behavior (Desposato, 2004; Tavits, 2011; Rosas and Langston, 2011).

Finally, we show that closed ballots are more likely to be chosen by personalistic parties. For this type of parties, closed lists help leaders to emphasize their personal reputation as the main electoral appeal to voters. This finding provides evidence regarding the conditions in which closed lists may provide personal vote-seeking incentives (Pachón and Shugart, 2010; Riera, 2011; Nemoto and Shugart, 2013).

The next section introduces our argument. Following that, we explain our study case and empirical expectations. We then

describe our data and present the empirical findings. Finally, we discuss our results and their implications for future research.

2. When parties and candidates work together

Our research explores the conditions in which the personal and party vote-seeking incentives complement, rather than compete with, each other. In particular, we propose that the success of a given party structure to align the interests of party leaders and candidates depends on the expected vote returns for promoting the party label *vis-à-vis* those emphasizing candidates’ personal reputations. On the one hand, party-vote seeking incentives arise when a partisan label helps the electorate identify candidates’ ideology or policy position (Katz, 1980; Cox, 1987). On the other hand, personal vote-seeking incentives depend on a candidate’s attributes, such as her performance in office (Fenno, 1977; Ames, 1995; Cox and Thies, 1998) or her fixed traits (Marsh, 1987; Shugart et al., 2005; Tavits, 2010; Reeves, 2015). The mix of both incentives defines the way in which each ballot structure moderates or exacerbates the conflict of interests between party leaders and candidates.

Depending on the characteristics of parties and candidates, each list type can align the party and personal vote-seeking incentives. Closed lists are a useful device to those parties that heavily depend on emphasizing the reputation of the party label, its leader, or the candidate listed at the top of the list. By contrast, open lists align the interests of parties and candidates whose expected returns from fostering a personal vote-seeking strategy are similar than those from promoting the party vote. In this case, parties’ seat expectations can take advantage of individual efforts, while candidates’ vote prospects simultaneously increase by promoting the party label.

Fig. 1 summarizes our argument regarding the conditions in which open and closed lists align the interests of parties and candidates. The horizontal axis represents the candidate’s expected benefits of cultivating a personal vote during campaign. We expect these benefits to be higher among candidates with previous experience in office, a highly recognizable name, or with the




Fig. 1. The role of the ballot structure to harmonize interests between parties and candidates.

Notes: Fig. 1 illustrates the argument proposed in this paper regarding the cases in which the ballot structure helps to coordinate the interests of parties and candidates. The horizontal and vertical axes represent the candidate’s expected benefits of cultivating a personal or a party vote, respectively.

resources to publicize their personal attributes (Ansolabehere et al., 2000; Reeves, 2015). Similarly, the vertical axis represents the candidate's expected benefits of cultivating a party vote. We expect larger returns for using the party label as a heuristic cue to voters among those established parties whose name is more recognizable in the electorate or with enough campaign resources to develop a media presence (Coan et al., 2008; Katz et al., 2011).

Consider first the situation at the upper-left corner of Fig. 1, where party vote-seeking incentives outweigh those of the personal vote-seeking counterpart. This condition applies to low-quality candidates, whose careers depend on their loyalty and effort to keep the party's collective reputation (Hangartner et al., 2016). In this case, a closed list helps the party capitalize its brand and discourages any candidate's profitable deviation from running a personal campaign (André et al., 2016, p. 45). In sum, closed lists align the incentives of parties and candidates whose larger electoral profits come from promoting a solid collective reputation.

By contrast, the right-down corner of Fig. 1 illustrates the case of those candidates able to earn their seat by promoting their personal features rather than a party brand. Building on the few works discussing the effects of the personal vote in closed-list systems (Riera, 2011; Nemoto and Shugart, 2013), we consider those instances wherein parties' seat expectations rely exclusively on the electoral performance of a few candidates, if not only one. In this case, a closed list helps the party exploit the candidate's personal reputation by placing her at the top of the list. Since this position guarantees her the first seat in the list, this strategy encourages the candidate to remain campaigning for the party. At the same time, the lower positions in the list are filled with the above mentioned low-quality candidates, whose seat expectations depend on promoting the top-ranked candidate. To avoid the temptation of free-riding, closed lists make sure that low-quality candidates remain promoting the list rather than campaigning by their own. This strategy, therefore, aligns the incentives of a party with a weak label, a popular candidate with enough electoral returns to get seats by promoting her image, and the rank-and-file candidates expecting coattail benefits from their leading candidate.

In the middle of both extremes, we explore those cases in which candidates' personal vote-seeking incentives are similar to those coming from cultivating the party vote. Unlike other preferential systems, an open ballot determines the seat-earning of each party by pooling the votes of all the candidates in the list, helping the party benefit from their candidates' individual efforts (Nemoto and Shugart, 2013; Bergman et al., 2013). The incentives to run personalized campaigns help large parties keep their electoral support away from niche parties because it allows candidates to maintain different positions on secondary issues (Blumenau et al., Forthcoming). At the same time, the party label appears still as a useful device for candidates when it helps voters infer their positions on issues and policy platforms (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; Lau and Redlawsk, 2001). Moreover, since parties decide who can use their label when campaigning, party reputation in open lists "still matters significantly" (Carey and Shugart, 1995, p. 427). Therefore, open lists align the campaign efforts of candidates whose personal vote-seeking incentives are similar to their party's vote-seeking counterpart.

Despite the collective benefits of promoting the personal vote under open lists, this ballot structure makes candidates compete for votes not only against other parties but also against their own co-partisan candidates. Recent works, however, demonstrate how parties have isolated the gains of promoting the personal vote from potential intra-party competition. In Brazil, for example, competition against co-partisan candidates varies across parties, responding to the centralization of the candidate nomination process and

the control of campaign funds (Samuels, 1999). Parties can also mitigate intra-party competition by endorsing fewer candidates than seats available in the district and limiting the number of high-quality candidates to the number of seats they expect to win in the district (Cheibub and Sin, 2014). Additionally, evidence for the Colombian Senate electoral campaigns shows how candidates split the district's territorial area into multiple sub-units. This strategy helps candidates campaign in a specific territory without overlapping their co-partisan's efforts (Crisp and Desposato, 2004). In sum, while open-lists can increase both the incentives of the personal vote and intra-party competition, parties have found ways to separate both effects.

Thus, our theory discusses the conditions in which open and closed lists align the incentives of candidates and parties. Open ballots are more likely to appear in cases in which candidates' expected returns for promoting their personal attributes are similar to those for promoting the party label. By contrast, closed ballots appear as the solution for parties with low expectations for their candidates' personal campaigns or when their electoral prospects rely heavily on the personal image of one candidate. Before discussing the empirical expectations of our argument, below we describe our case study and how it is usual to answer our research question.

3. Colombia's legislative elections

Our empirical analysis uses data from the last three legislative elections in Colombia, which are contested every four years across thirty-three multi-member districts. In each of these districts, parties present either an open or closed list, and their choices can vary across districts and election years.³ These institutional features represent an unusual opportunity to study parties' decisions over the list type in a given district.

The possibility for parties to select their own ballot structure came after the 2003 electoral reform, whose goal was to correct the extreme personalization of the previous electoral system.⁴ Before 2003, legislative seats were assigned using a simple quota and largest remainders (SQLR) formula, and parties were allowed to present multiple lists in every district. These electoral rules splintered partisan support into separate voters' blocs, each delimited by its connection to a specific candidate (Moreno and Escobar-Lemmon, 2008; Shugart et al., 2010; Botero et al., 2011). The two legislative elections before the reform illustrate the extreme fractionalization of electoral competition, in which each House seat was filled by a different list (Pachón and Shugart, 2010, p. 650).

To ameliorate the extreme personalization of the electoral system, the original bill of the electoral reform proposed several changes to strengthen the party system, such as implementing a D'Hondt divisor, introducing an electoral threshold to allow partisan representation, and restricting parties to present one list per district (Rodríguez-Raga and Botero, 2006). While these changes received general support, legislators could not agree on the ballot structure for the new electoral system; the arguments promoting the open list to avoid the control of political bosses over candidates' nomination confronted President Álvaro Uribe and the legislators of his party, who supported closed lists as a mechanism to abate the personalization of the electoral competition. While the ballot structure appeared as one of the main roadblocks for approving the reform, the general willingness to change the electoral system left the decision of the list type up to the parties in

³ Figure B in the Appendix shows an example of the ballot papers presenting both types of lists to the voter.

⁴ See Shugart et al. (2010) for a detailed debriefing of the electoral reform in Colombia and its consequences.

every district (Shugart et al., 2010).

The existent works evaluating the electoral reform in Colombia focus on its effect upon the number of parties, party cohesiveness, and electoral volatility.⁵ Instead, our paper shifts the attention to the unexplored issue of parties' decision to compete under an open or closed list. This approach is related to two specific articles on this topic. First, Pachón and Shugart (2010) use data from the 2006 legislative election to suggest that closed lists are a useful device for those candidates ranked in the top slot. Similarly, Hangartner et al. (2016) explore the consequences of selecting open and closed lists in Colombian municipal elections. Based on extensive interview work, the authors demonstrate that closed lists are organized to be led by an "expert," or someone with resources to attract a large number of votes to the list, and followed by "loyalists," policy-driven individuals with strong partisan attachments. Our paper complements the works cited above by studying parties' choices over open or closed lists.

Ideally, we could study the decisions over the ballot structure by exploring the parties' internal rules. However, the rules on this issue are vague for many parties and unstable over time (Giraldo and Muñoz, 2014a, p. 121). The mechanisms by which parties define their electoral strategy may even vary across districts. For instance, the way lists are built within the Liberal and Conservative parties, the oldest parties in the country, varies from taking the advice of the incumbent legislators in the district to confronting the central leadership and the party's local sub-units on the candidates' endorsement (Battle, 2014, p. 45).

Qualitative evidence suggests that these informal decisions depend on two separate forces. On the one hand, party leaders select the ballot structure and endorse the candidates that better help them maximize their seat share. On the other hand, candidates seek the endorsement of any party that increases their individual chances of earning a seat, either by allowing them to cultivate the personal vote or by using the party label as a heuristic cue to voters.⁶ The combination of these two forces produce different selection methods across parties and districts. In other words, the ballot structure is not only a device for coordinating the party's campaign efforts, but also for candidates to consider when to seek a party's endorsement.

Therefore, we can group the mechanisms in which parties build their lists in three categories. The first one allows party members to choose the legislative candidates and the ballot structure through a party convention. In this case, the party's endorsements and electoral strategy requires the support of a large group of party members. This procedure was followed by the *Independent Movement of Absolute Renovation*, or MIRA, whose lists for the 2014 election were integrated after the vote of its 580 party members.⁷

A second way in which parties build their lists results from the bargaining of the central and local party leaderships (Wills-Otero,

2016). The resulting decisions depend on the leverage that the sub-national leaders have on the decisions of the central party. In some cases, local and national party leaderships can work together to coordinate their electoral strategies. An example of this collaboration is the case of the Democratic Center Party for the forthcoming 2018 legislative election, in which local sub-units will configure the lists for the House in all but the two largest districts in the country.⁸ In other cases, however, national leaders surrender themselves to the overwhelming influence of the local party branches on the district lists. Consider, for example, the case of the Radical Change and Liberal parties' leaders, who resigned from their party positions to protest the endorsement of controversial candidates.⁹

A final and last way in which parties conform their lists rests in the hands of the party leaders. In this case, the interests of the central leadership prevails over those from candidates and local leaders when the strength of the party's social roots is enough to obtain seats regardless the type of endorsed candidates (Wills-Otero et al., 2011). The Green Party illustrates this mechanism, as its central leadership had the last word on the lists proposed by the local sub-units, rejecting even those lists with consensus at the local level (Battle, 2014, p. 56–58).

The arguments that leaders provide for the selection of each list type depend on the personal and party vote-seeking incentives. Anecdotal evidence suggests that closed lists are chosen when the party leader or the top-ranked candidates have large incentives to cultivate their personal vote. For example, the Christian Civic Commitment with the Community (C4) presented only closed lists during the 2006 election to emphasize the personal image of Jimmy Chamorro, the party's founder.¹⁰ During the same election, *Visionaries with Antanas Mockus*, a party created and led by the former Mayor of Bogotá, ran in all districts using closed lists, each of them placing in the first slot a public figure closely connected to Mockus.¹¹ As a candidate of the Democratic Center Party (PCD)—a party founded and led by former President Álvaro Uribe—describes: "I was not very supportive of the closed lists because I thought that every candidate must get their own votes. However, I later realized that Uribe is the one who brings the votes, and that is why our loyalty to him is important."¹²

By contrast, supporters of the open list highlight its incentives to achieve collective electoral efforts. These benefits are illustrated by the Liberal Party in 2006, when the party leadership decided to present open lists and selectively endorse those candidates who could bring the largest electoral returns without engaging in territorial competition with any other member of the list.¹³ As Clara López, the former leader of the Democratic Pole Party (*Polo Democrático*), describes, "[U]nlike the closed system, in which the top-ranked candidates relax their campaign efforts, the advantage [of the open list] is that all candidates need to work to get

⁵ Rodríguez-Raga and Botero (2006) highlight the increasing party cohesiveness and proportionality in the seat distribution after the reform. Shugart et al. (2010) show that the reform reduced the number of party labels contesting elections, though the electoral number of parties remained higher than expected for the first post-reform election. Pachón and Shugart (2010) find that competition levels within and among parties are conditioned by the district magnitude. Dargent and Muñoz (2011) argue that the reform had meager effects on party institutionalization, since party-switching and electoral volatility remained high. Finally, Albarracín and Milanese (2012) evaluate the effects of the reform for the city council elections and find that the number of parties has increased since 2003.

⁶ See, for example: "Los partidos políticos se agrietan," *Semana*. July 18, 2015. <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/los-partidos-politicos-se-agrietan-por-avales/435242-3>.

⁷ "Mira: con lista cerrada a Senado y abierta a Cámara," *Vanguardia Liberal*. February 23, 2013. <http://www.vanguardia.com/actualidad/colombia/197568-mira-con-lista-cerrada-a-senado-y-abierta-a-camara>.

⁸ "Se reacomodan los partidos políticos en Antioquia," *El Colombiano*. November 26, 2016. <http://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/politica/se-reacomodan-los-partidos-politicos-en-antioquia-KY5441862>.

⁹ "Los partidos políticos se agrietan," *Semana*. July 18, 2015. <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/los-partidos-politicos-se-agrietan-por-avales/435242-3>.

¹⁰ http://www.terra.com.co/elecciones_2006/partidos/07-02-2006/nota274826.html.

¹¹ http://www.terra.com.co/elecciones_2006/partidos/07-02-2006/nota274826.html.

¹² "La puja por las listas uribistas al Congreso," *La Silla Vacía*. September 18, 2013. <http://lasillavacia.com/historia/la-puja-por-las-listas-uribistas-al-congreso-45660>. Our translation.

¹³ http://www.terra.com.co/elecciones_2006/partidos/16-01-2006/nota271446.html.




Fig. 2. Proportion of closed-lists by political party. Colombian legislative elections, 2006–2014.

Notes: This graph shows the proportion of districts in which parties run under a closed-list during the national legislative elections of 2006, 2010, and 2014. Every bubble represents a party competing in a given year. The size of each bubble symbolizes the number of lists that the party presented; and its vertical position represents the share of closed lists for the party. The dashed line shows the overall proportion of closed lists competing in every election.

elected.”¹⁴

The choice of the ballot structure is not necessarily uniform across parties, nor does it hold over time. Fig. 2 illustrates the proportion of closed lists that parties presented between 2006 and 2014. Every bubble represents a party competing in a given year, and they are horizontally sorted in three groups, one for each legislative election. The size of each bubble symbolizes the number of lists the party presented in the election, or the number of districts in which the party competed. Finally, the vertical position of a bubble indicates the party's share of closed lists presented in the election. Consider, for example, the largest bubble at the top of the graph for the 2010 election, which represents the thirty-one closed lists that the *Independent Movement of Absolute Renovation* (MIRA) presented that year. Similarly, the bubble situated just above 0.50 for the 2010 election symbolizes the ten closed ballots from among the nineteen lists that the *Green Party* presented that year.

The information from Fig. 2 confirms the expectation of Shugart et al. (2010) on how the electoral reform should gradually decrease the number of parties in the system. In this case, the number of party labels dropped from 39 in 2006—the first election after the reform—to 12 during the 2014 election. Moreover, and more importantly for our purpose, parties rarely choose the same ballot structure across districts. As the figure shows, eight out of the twelve parties competing in the 2014 election presented both open and closed lists.

The temporal variation of closed lists can also be observed across districts. As Figure B in the Appendix shows, the share of closed lists in every district varies over time. For example, the percentage of closed lists in Santander changed from 6% in 2006 to 25% in 2010 to 12% in 2014. Similarly, this number in Bogotá represented 23% of the lists in 2006, 18% in 2010, and 30% in 2014.

On the whole, the data suggest a dynamic choice of the ballot structure. The hypotheses below propose three potential

determinants shaping the selection of open and closed lists, depending on the characteristics of the parties and candidates, plus the institutional context under which they compete.

4. Observable implications

The literature of political institutions has provided a wealth of hypotheses concerning the effects of the ballot structure on intra-partisan behavior (Morgenstern, 2004; Hix, 2004; Crisp et al., 2004; Carey, 2007; Kam, 2009). We attempt to complement these findings by providing evidence from a within-country variance case that isolates cultural, history-dependent, or institutional factors to understand the determinants of selecting a list type when parties have the opportunity to do so. We test the implications of our theory regarding how the ballot structure helps parties and candidates to align their electoral goals. Given the context of our study case, where parties are institutionally weak and have fewer resources than those enjoyed by legislators (Crisp and Desposato, 2004; Payne, 2006; Jones, 2010), our null hypothesis is that Colombian parties present open lists as their default choice. Therefore, we proposing three factors affecting the strategies to cultivate the personal *vis-à-vis* the party vote: (1) the district magnitude, (2) the organizational power of the party's local sub-units, and (3) the personal leadership of the parties.

First, we propose that the incentives to present closed lists are inversely related with district magnitude. This hypothesis builds on the inconclusive expectations of open-list systems and district magnitude on the personalization of the vote (Renwick and Pilet, 2016, p. 30–32; André et al., 2016). On the one hand, as the number of seats available in the district increases, candidates have larger incentives to emphasize their personal attributes, since they need to differentiate themselves from competitors outside and inside their party (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Shugart et al., 2005). On the other hand, voters' cognitive efforts to distinguish among candidates increases with the set of alternatives (Cunow, 2014). In other words, as the candidate pool increases, voters spend less time learning about each politician, weakening the personal connection between the candidates and their constituencies (Katz, 1980). These contradictory effects produce ambiguous results, making the personal vote-seeking incentives in open-lists contingent on other factors (Renwick and Pilet, 2016).

We propose that, open lists in large-magnitude districts help parties to exploit the incentives of cultivating both the personal and the party vote. While open lists foster the personal vote-seeking incentives, candidates' individual campaign efforts collectively increase the vote aggregate for the entire list (Bergman et al., 2013). In other words, while candidates benefit from their co-partisans' collective efforts, they still depend on their own campaign to earn a seat. At the same time, since large districts dilute the personal connection between voters and candidates, the latter group also has incentives to coordinate campaign efforts among co-partisans and promote the party label as a valuable heuristic cue to voters (Katz, 1980, p. 48–52; Cox, 1987, p. 129).

However, the capacity for open lists to align the personal and party vote-seeking incentives decreases in small-magnitude districts. To illustrate this case, consider both types of incentives in Chile's legislative elections, where parties and coalitions present open lists across two-seat districts. Similar to the Colombian case, seats are allocated according to the D'Hondt method, forcing parties to obtain more than twice the votes of any other list to get both seats in the district. This situation confronts candidates' electoral goals with those from their parties. On the one hand, candidates want to maximize their chances of obtaining a seat, so

¹⁴ “¿Deberían los electores votar por un partido y no por una persona?” *El País*, October 6, 2013. <http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/colombia/noticias/voto-preferente-sigue-generando-polemica>. Our translation.

they would prefer being listed with a co-partisan with poor electoral prospects. On the other hand, parties want to maximize their total number of earned seats, so they would prefer presenting lists with two strong candidates to increase the chances of “doubling” the district. As a result, parties need to carefully nominate the pair of candidates who can not only bring the largest number of votes to the list, but can also do so without engaging in intra-party competition (Siavelis, 2002; Carey and Siavelis, 2005). Moreover, Chilean parties carry a system of informal compensations to those candidates who could not obtain a second seat. This compensation system, in which parties provide appointed posts to losing candidates, is thus impossible in the Colombian case, where parties are institutionally weak and have fewer resources than those enjoyed by legislators.

Therefore, parties are more likely to choose a closed list in small districts to avoid the negative consequences of intra-party competition. Since the probability for a list to obtain an additional seat is inversely related to district magnitude, small magnitude districts decrease the collective benefits of pooling votes among list members, weakening the incentives for co-partisan coordination and exacerbating intra-party competition. To prevent this problem, parties prefer to run under a closed ballot insofar as it aligns the partisan and individual efforts of candidates within a list.

Hypothesis 1. Parties are more likely to choose closed ballots in small-magnitude districts.

Our second expectation considers the different incentives to cultivate the party and personal vote across local sub-units (Michels, 1962; Panebianco, 1988). As parties expand their territorial organization, the electoral operation ends up in the hands of electoral agents with enough local knowledge and resources to set up a continuous connection with grassroots constituents (Schattschneider, 1942). The delegation of organizational tasks, however, comes at the cost of a potential power structure between the central leadership and local branches. Local agents can exploit their personal reputation in the region to advance their political careers and influence in the party (Szwarcberg, 2015). Moreover, since the party's electoral success depends more on the performance of its local branches, sub-national units have greater leeway to act on the party's behalf and challenge the decisions of central leadership (Sartori, 1976).

Nevertheless, the power struggle between the party leadership and its local sub-units is not evenly distributed across territories (Tavits, 2011). The relative strength of each local branch is a function of the local agents' ability to use their personal networks in the benefit of the party (Key, 1949, p. 304). In other words, the more votes a local sub-unit can bring to the party, the more valuable it is for the party structure. Therefore, those party sub-units with a strong electoral organization are more likely to level out their relationship with the central leadership than those with weak resources to mobilize the electorate.

We expect, then, that parties are more likely to present closed lists in districts where the sub-units earn very poor or null electoral results in local elections. In these conditions, sub-units use a closed list to compensate for their poor electoral capacity with the promotion of the partisan brand. By contrast, sub-units with a strong local electoral organization can use an open list to exploit the personal connections between the local agents and voters. Furthermore, since powerful local sub-units are in a better position to bargain with the central leadership (Tavits, 2011), an open list ameliorates the potential conflict of a centralized candidate nomination, allowing both local and national party leaders to endorse the candidates they prefer.

Hypothesis 2. Parties are more likely to choose closed ballots in districts with weak local sub-units.

Finally, we consider cases in which a closed list is a helpful device for a personal vote-seeking strategy. In particular, we focus on the selection of the ballot structure among personalist parties, organizations created and designed around their leaders' own political ambitions (Gunther and Diamond, 2003; Scarrow, 2005; Levitt, 2012; Kostadinova and Levitt, 2014).¹⁵ These parties distinguish themselves by having a cohesive coalition backing the leader whose reputation is the main appeal to the electorate (Panebianco, 1988, p. 145).

We then expect that personalist parties are more likely to choose a closed list, since this ballot structure condenses the electoral efforts of the leader and candidates in three ways. First, closed lists help leaders of personalist parties maintain control of the partisan structure by centralizing candidate nominations and threatening legislators who breach party unity (Hazan and Rahat, 2010, p.73). Second, since the electoral prospects of personalist parties often rely on their leader's reputation, closed lists are useful for discouraging rank-and-file candidates from promoting the personal vote for anyone but the leader. Finally, candidates listed below the leader or top-ranked positions are willing to compete in a closed list as long as this strategy helps them benefit along the electoral coattails of their leader, particularly when these benefits outweigh those expected from running outside the party.

Hypothesis 3. Closed lists are more likely to be chosen by personalist parties.

5. Empirical analysis

5.1. Variables

To explore what determines parties' decisions over the ballot structure, we gathered information on the 944 lists registered in Colombia during the three legislative elections held after the 2003 electoral reform. Our dependent variable is *Closed List*, an indicator variable coded “1” if the list in a given district and election year is a closed list, and “0” if it is an open list.

Our main independent variables operationalize the theoretical expectations described above. First, *Log magnitude* is the logged number of legislative seats in every district. District magnitude in Colombia ranges from two to eighteen seats, and we take the logarithm of this number to account for a potential non-linear relationship. Second, we consider the local electoral strength of a party. Specifically, *Local votes* measures the share of votes the party received in a given district during the previous election for Department Assembly.¹⁶ Finally, we used journalistic and academic sources to identify those parties characterized by a personalistic leadership. Following on Coppedge's (1997) coding rules, our variable *Personal Party* identifies those parties that either: (1) base their primary appeal on the charisma, authority, or efficacy of their leader rather than on any specific principle or platform, (2) endorse

¹⁵ Examples of this type of parties include Silvio Berlusconi's *Forza Italia* (Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999), Evo Morales' *Movement Towards Socialism (MAS)* in Bolivia (Van Cott, 2005; Morgan, 2011), or Ariel Sharon's *Kadima* in Israel (Hazan, 2007).

¹⁶ The Department Assemblies are in charge of oversight the state executive. Their members are elected every four years by the same rules applied to the National House of Representatives. This institution exists in all departments in the country with the exception of the Capital District (i.e., Bogotá). For the latter case, we take the elections for City Council.

outlier or independent candidates, or (3) back a candidate forming an ideologically heterogeneous front.¹⁷ The list of coded parties, their description, and the sources we used in every case are available in the [Appendix](#).

We also include a battery of control variables to work against the possibility that our claimed relationships are spurious. First, since many personalist parties in our database are newly formed, we include *New Party*, which identifies those parties competing in a legislative election for the first time, or whose registration date occurred during the three years leading to the election. Experimental research has shown how the electoral returns of promoting a party brand are larger among those parties with a recognized label with the electorate (Coan et al., 2008; Katz et al., 2011). By contrast, recently created parties have not established a long-term reputation with voters, making them more difficult to promote a cohesive ideological position to the electorate (Lupu and Riedl, 2012). We then expect that, if the positive relationship between closed lists and personalist parties is due to their recent formation, then we should not observe any effect after including this control.

Next, it is possible the ballot structure decision is not explained by the electoral strength of the party in every district, but simply by the party's capacity to endorse candidates in multiple districts (Tavits, 2011). To account for this issue, *Party Size* is the share of districts in which the party presents a list in a given legislative election. We then expect that larger parties are more likely to present open lists to encourage candidates in every district to campaign for their votes while simultaneously promoting the party brand.

We also check for whether the expected effect of district magnitude is sensitive to the level of electoral coordination in the district (Cox, 1999; Potter, Forthcoming). To account for this possibility, we control for the proportion of wasted votes in the previous election by calculating the *Effective number of losing parties*, which provides a district measure of the voters' support to a party unable to earn a seat (Crisp et al., 2012).¹⁸ When voters fail to coordinate their choices on the ballot, electoral support splits across multiple parties, increasing the number of lists with a realistic opportunity to earn a seat. This effect, however, is more evident in low-magnitude districts, where, as explained above, the D'Hondt method makes it more difficult for a list to obtain an additional seat. Fragmented electoral support lures high-quality candidates to lead their own list rather than sharing one. As a result, the number of lists competing in the district will increase, each of them concentrating efforts on its top candidate (Pachón and Shugart, 2010). If

the effect of district magnitude simply captures the level of electoral coordination, interacting *Log magnitude* and *Effective number of losing parties* should make the marginal effect of the former disappear.

Moreover, we control for the level of electoral competitiveness in the district. Our expectation is that open lists are more prevalent in highly competitive districts, where encouraging candidates to increase their campaigns efforts may increase the party's chances to obtain an additional seat. Therefore, we include *Electoral Contestation*, the weighted average number of votes that every party would need to either lose its last obtained seat or win an additional one during the previous legislative election (Grofman and Selb, 2009).¹⁹

Finally, we include three sociodemographic controls to account for alternative explanations of the ballot choice. We consider first whether the incentives to cultivate a personal vote in a district depends on voters' level of political sophistication. In other words, we consider the possibility that the personal vote-seeking incentives depend on voters' level of political information and ability to distinguish between co-partisan candidates (Marsh, 1985; André et al., 2012). To account for this effect, our estimations include the proportion of illiterate citizens and the GDP per capita in the district. Furthermore, we evaluate the possibility that terrorist violence affects the parties and candidates' behavior, not to mention the choices for list type. This control follows recent evidence focusing on the repercussions of terrorist attacks on the behavior of candidates and voters (Kibris, 2011; Dunning, 2011; Montalvo, 2011; Getmansky and Zeitzoff, 2014). In the case of Colombia, existent research suggests that armed groups have influenced the election by mobilizing voters or vetoing electoral campaigns in certain areas of the country (Garcia, 2007). Moreover, anecdotal evidence from the 1990s reveals the demand of some political parties to de-personalize electoral campaigns to guarantee the physical survival of some candidates (Taylor, 2009, p. 153). We expect, then, that when candidates have additional obstacles to maintaining a personal contact with voters, they will be more likely to emphasize the party label through a closed list. To account for this possibility, we include the number of terrorist attacks per 100,000 inhabitants over the three years leading to the election. The information for these variables comes from the yearly databank of the *Universidad de los Andes'* Center of Studies on Economic Development (CEDE).²⁰

5.2. Findings

Our outcome of interest is the selection of a closed ballot among 944 electoral lists across 48 parties and 33 districts. Therefore, we specify a multilevel binomial logit regression as follows:

$$\text{Closed}_{ipd} \sim \text{Logit}(\alpha_p + \gamma_d + X_{ipd}\beta, \sigma_i^2) \quad (1)$$

$$\alpha_p \sim N(X_p\delta, \sigma_p^2) \quad (1a)$$

$$\gamma_d \sim N(X_d\eta, \sigma_d^2) \quad (1b)$$

where $\text{Closed}_{i,p,d}$ indicates the existence of a closed ballot for list i by party p in district d , X_{ipd} is the matrix of list variables, α_p is a random intercept at the party-level, X_p is a matrix of party-specific variables, γ_d is a random intercept at the district-level, and X_d is a

¹⁷ These characteristics are very similar to what Pizarro Leongómez (2002) uses to identify the personalistic parties, or *microempresas*, in Colombia before the electoral reform.

¹⁸ The estimation of this variable is a modification of Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) effective number of parties. In this case, the measurement restricts its attention to those parties that did not obtain a seat, rescaling their share of vote adding to 1.

¹⁹ Following Grofman and Selb (2009), we build this variable using four inputs: (1) the district magnitude (m); (2) the threshold of exclusion ($T^E = \frac{1}{m+1}$), which indicates the vote share that guarantees a seat to any party; (3) the votes needed for a party to gain a seat ($X_i^G = [(s_i + 1)/(m + 1)] - v_i$ if $s_i < m$), where s_i and v_i are the number of seats won and vote share for party i , respectively; and (4) the votes required for a party to lose its last seat ($X_i^L = (-s_i v_j + s_j v_i + v_i)/(s_i + s_j + 1)$), where j is the runner-up party for that seat. The index of party competition is denoted by $c_i = \max[(T^E - X_i^G), (T^E - X_i^L)]/T^E$, and the weighted average of the indexes for all the parties in the district provides the overall competition level. The Colombian case requires two additional clarifications for the construction of this index. First, despite the change of the electoral system from SQLR to D'Hondt, the threshold of exclusion is calculated in the same way (Grofman, 2001). Second, in some cases, the number of votes needed for a party to either gain or obtain a seat is larger than the threshold of exclusion. When this occurs, we take the latter input to estimate the index. For more details, see Grofman and Selb (2009, fn. 8).

²⁰ <https://datoscede.uniandes.edu.co>. The data for the illiteracy rate and GDP per capita are for 2005, which is the year with the last official statistics available.

matrix of district-level covariates.

Table 1 reports the point estimates and standard errors for our estimated model. Columns (1)–(3) test each of our key independent variables separately, and Column (4) presents the results of our benchmark estimation. The results of these models showing the estimates for our control variables are available in Table C in the Appendix. Moreover, Fig. 3 illustrates the predicted probabilities for observing a closed list, given a specific district magnitude and party leadership, after bootstrapping 1000 samples from our database. The figure presents four plots, each of them setting *Local Strength* at its minimum, median, third quarter, and maximum values in our database.

Supporting Hypothesis 1, the coefficient for *LogMagnitude* is negative and statistically significant. In other words, closed lists are more likely to appear in low-magnitude districts. Fig. 3 illustrates this finding, where the predicted probability of a list to run as closed is on average twice as likely to appear in a district with a magnitude of two than in a district with a magnitude of seventeen. A suggestive way to confirm this relationship is by observing the prevalence of the closed ballots during the 2014 election. While thirty-four closed lists appeared in districts with magnitude equal or lower than five, only eight closed lists appeared in districts with a larger district magnitude. This pattern is also noticeable for the two largest parties competing in the 2014 election: the Liberal Party and the National Unity Party. Each ran under open lists in all but a couple of districts with a magnitude of two.

As for the effect of the electoral organization of the party sub-units, *Local Strength* is negatively related to the selection of a closed ballot. This pattern suggests that the probability of a list to be closed declines with the party's vote share in the preceding local election. As Fig. 3 illustrates, the predicted probability for a no personalist party to present a closed list in a district of magnitude two is about thirty percent when its local sub-unit got no votes in the previous local election. This probability declines to less than ten percent when *Local Strength* gets to 0.5—the largest empirical value in our database. The pattern is consistent with the individual cases in our database. For example, consider the case of the 2014 election,

where the National Unity Party presented lists in all 33 districts of the country, but only two of them were closed. In one of these districts, Casanare, the party got less than 10% of the vote in 2011, its lowest vote share at the district level for the preceding local election.

Finally, consistent with Hypothesis 3, we find a positive effect of *Personal Party* on the selection of the closed list. Overall, personal parties are about as twice as likely to run under closed lists than non-personal parties. This finding goes in line with our expectations from our theory and anecdotal evidence. Moreover, this result provides empirical support to the argument sustaining the selection of the closed list as a tool to personalize the election of a particular candidate (Pachón and Shugart, 2010). Out of the seventeen parties that we labeled as personalist, thirteen of them presented at least one closed list during a legislative election.

Fig. 3 also illustrates the predicted probabilities for a party to present a closed list by combining different values of our key independent variables. The simulations are consistent with the specific cases in our database. Consider, for example, the case of the Liberal Party for selecting an open list in Antioquia and a closed list in Cáqueta during the 2006 election. While its predicted probability to present a closed list in a district like Antioquia, with magnitude seventeen and where it obtained about 25% of the votes in the last local election, is about 0.01, the probability for the same party in a district like Caquetá, with magnitude two and where its local sub-unit achieved about 16% of the votes in the last local election, is close to 0.20. Similarly, consider the case of the Liberal Opening Movement in 2010. The party is coded in our database as personalistic and obtained in both districts less than 2% of the votes prior to the legislative election. However, the party presented an open list in Bogotá and a closed list in Guain'ia. As the simulations in Fig. 3 illustrate, the probabilities for a party with such characteristics to present a closed list in districts of magnitudes eighteen and two are 0.18 and 0.50, respectively.

To verify the consistency of the claimed relationships, Table 2 checks for additional variables that may affect the robustness of our results. First, column (1) reruns our benchmark model and includes the party's *Lagged Vote Share* in the district during the previous legislative election. This variable tests whether the observed effect for *Local Vote* sustains after considering additional information on the party's electoral performance in the district. The analysis of this variable, however, omits those parties that competed in a given district for the first time. Also, to check for a potential path dependency on the parties' choices, Model (2) includes *Lagged Closed*, which indicates whether the party presented a closed list during the previous election in the district. This variable subsets our database to those cases competing in 2010 and 2014 and have presented a list in a district for two consecutive elections.

Models (3)–(5) of Table 2 test for whether our main findings hold after controlling for the candidates' personal vote earning attributes (PVEAs) (Shugart et al., 2005; Tavits, 2010; Nemoto and Shugart, 2013). In particular, we focus on the local connection of the candidates with their constituency, and how their local-level experience provides an information cue about their knowledge and interest on the district's issues (Marsh, 1987; Shugart et al., 2005; Tavits, 2010). This alternative explanation suggests that candidates' incentives to exploit their personal attributes increase with the number of candidates with local experience in the list. As such, these candidates pressure to compete with open

Table 1
Coefficient estimates (and standard errors) for the selection of the closed ballot.

	Dependent variable: Closed List			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log Magnitude	–1.008*** (0.310)			–1.345*** (0.342)
Local Strength		–3.947** (1.851)		–3.749** (1.844)
Personal Party			1.272** (0.591)	1.029* (0.572)
σ_p	1.610	1.555	1.633	1.541
σ_d	0.664	0.861	0.856	0.606
Observations	944	944	944	944
Parties	48	48	48	48
Districts	33	33	33	33
Log Likelihood	–381.483	–383.720	–383.582	–375.482
Akaike Inf. Crit.	788.966	793.440	793.163	782.964
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	852.018	856.492	856.215	860.566

Notes: Estimates are based on logistic regressions. All models include control variables at the party (*New Party and Party Size*) and district level (*Electoral Competition*, the *Effective Number of Losing Parties*, *GDP per capita*, *Literacy Rate*, and *Guerrilla Attacks*), as well as fixed effects for election-year. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; and * is significant at the 10% level.




Fig. 3. Predicted probabilities for the selection of the closed list.

Notes: This graph shows the predicted probabilities for the selection of the closed list given a specific district magnitude for personalist and non-personalist parties. Each plot sets the value for *Local Strength* at its minimum (0), its median (0.07), its third quarter (0.13), and its maximum value in the database (0.5). Plots are based on the estimates of Model 4 in Table 2. Each plot shows the mean estimate and 95% confidence intervals computed from bootstrapping the results with 1000 replications.

Table 2

Coefficient estimates (and standard errors) for the selection of the closed ballot. Robustness checks.

	Dependent variable: Closed List				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Log Magnitude	−1.672*** (0.522)	−2.021*** (0.548)	−1.336*** (0.342)	−1.306*** (0.346)	−1.347*** (0.340)
Local Strength	−0.787*** (0.272)	−0.476** (0.228)	−0.327* (0.177)	−0.383** (0.177)	−0.358** (0.181)
Personal Party	−0.305 (0.851)	−0.305 (0.880)	1.025* (0.566)	1.008* (0.581)	1.034* (0.579)
Lagged Vote Share	0.608** (0.250)				
Lagged Closed		−0.746 (0.562)			
Locals			−0.689 (0.704)		
Incumbents				1.409* (0.841)	
Top Local					0.126 (0.276)
σ_p	1.184	1.247	1.516	1.579	1.570
σ_d	0.663	0.797	0.606	0.617	0.596
Observations	489	489	944	944	944
Parties	25	25	48	48	48
Districts	33	33	33	33	33
Log Likelihood	−153.995	−156.304	−375.007	−374.155	−373.725
Akaike Inf. Crit.	339.989	344.608	784.014	782.310	781.451
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	407.067	411.686	866.466	864.762	863.794

Notes: Estimates are based on logistic regressions. All models include control variables at the party (*Party Size*) and district level (*Electoral Competition*, the *Effective Number of Losing Parties*, *GDP per capita*, *Literacy Rates*, and *Guerrilla Attacks*), as well as year fixed-effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; and * is significant at the 10% level.

list. By contrast, “carpetbaggers,” or candidates with no local connection to the district (Ranney, 1981), have fewer attributes to cultivate the personal vote, so they are less inclined to run under an open list.

To evaluate this possibility, we collected biographical information for every candidate running for a legislative seat from 2006 to 2014, identifying those candidates with an elected position in the district during the eight years prior to the election.²¹ We then identify candidates PVEAs of every list in three ways. First, *Locals* is the share of candidates with local experience in the list. Second, we also account for the share of *Incumbents* legislators seeking reelection. Finally, *Top Local* identifies those lists led by a local or an

²¹ Candidates were identified as having local experience in the district whenever they were elected to any of the following public offices: Governor, Mayor, Department Legislator, and City Councillor.

incumbent candidate. While these variables help us to test the strength of our claimed effects, we should be cautious on the interpretation of these variables. In particular, since parties need to register the candidates and the type of list in which they will compete in every district at the same time, we are unable to distinguish whether the pool of candidates defines the ballot choice or that parties build their lists given the ballot structure that they initially chose.

The results from Table 2 show that the effects of *Log Magnitude* and *Local Vote* hold in every specification. In other words, the expected empirical relationship between these two variables and the ballot choice remains statistically significant after considering the previous decision in the district, electoral results, and personal characteristics of every list. The estimates also show significant results for *Personal Party* for all but models (1) and (2). This lack of significance comes from leaving out most of the parties coded as personalist, since only five out of the seventeen parties classified as personalist competed in a legislative election more than once.

We briefly discuss the results of our additional controls. First, those parties with the largest vote shares in the previous election were more likely to present closed lists. This variable presents an opposite effect that what observed for *Local Strength*, suggesting that the party's vote share in the district has different effects on the ballot choice depending on the election type. Second, the ballot selection is not time dependent. In other words, a party that presented a closed list in the previous election does not necessarily repeat its choice in the subsequent contest. Finally, as Columns (3)–(5) in Table 2 show, the only PVEA included in the analysis with an effect statistically different from zero is *Incumbents*. In other words, the larger the share of incumbent candidates in the list, the more likely is to compete in closed lists. Additional analyses in the Appendix show that this effect only holds in small magnitude districts.

Tables E and F in the Appendix show that the results also hold for alternative specifications of our model. In particular, the direction and statistical significance of our main independent variables are robust to controlling the PVEAs by district magnitude and to including propensity scores weighting for district magnitude and list led by a local candidates. Also, our finding holds using two alternative specifications for our control variables. First, we replaced *New Party* for *Party Age*, a variable that indicates the time length in terms of year between the moment in which the party was registered and the election day. Second, to test for potential non-linear effects of violence, we include a quadratic term to *Attacks*. In any case, the claimed effects of our main explanatory variables hold under these additional set of controls.

6. Conclusion

This paper explores what are the incentives of political parties to personalize their electoral strategies. The literature on political institutions often places the incentives for personal and partisan representation as substitutes, and that this zero-sum game is determined by the way voters can express their preferences on

the ballot. Instead, we argue that the ballot structure does not necessarily juxtapose the personal and partisan vote: while open lists help parties to promote both the personal and partisan votes, closed lists concentrate the efforts on either vote-seeking strategy.

Using an original database for the selection of the list type, we analyze the decisions of the parties to compete with an open or closed list given the institutional characteristics in the district and the internal organization of every party. The results show that parties are more likely to choose open lists in large-magnitude districts and when they are backed by a local sub-unit with strong electoral representation. In this case, parties are willing to allow personal representation when their candidates' individual efforts can be pooled in the party and do not detriment the value of the party label. Moreover, we unpack the personalizing effects of the ballot structure at the intra-party level—wherein an open list encourages candidates to emphasize their personal attributes—and the inter-party level—wherein a closed ballot helps party leaders or charismatic candidates to condense their campaign efforts.

The Colombian case offers an unusual opportunity to study the intra-party dimension of the electoral system choice by distinguishing its district and partisan influences. However, it is important to acknowledge that the lack of information about the internal organization of the Colombian parties impedes us to explore further how the power dynamics determine their electoral strategies and decisions on the ballot structure. Although out of the scope of this paper, this could be a potential extension in which our database could extend the research agenda. Much can be said about how the internal organization of parties determines the preferences for the ballot structure. Beyond our coding for personal parties, we expect that a party with a centralized structure is more willing to compete under closed lists. By contrast, parties with decentralized nomination rules are more willing to compete under open ballots. This potential extension of the research could talk to the literature regarding the internal organization of a party and its consequences for electoral competition (Hazan and Rahat, 2010).

A second potential extension of our research is the role of the ballot type on party splits. Candidates may remain in a party whenever it provides better prospectives for seat-gaining than elsewhere (Desposato, 2006). Therefore, when a decision results from the competition's structure and position on the list, inter-party competition determines how vulnerable parties are to internal splits. In Colombia, the variance on the structure of the competition offers a fine-grained opportunity to study the electoral opportunities for party-switching.

In one of the initial works on electoral reforms, Lijphart (1994) warned of the risks of changing the electoral rules based on “narrow partisan purposes” (p. 151). By exploring a scenario that disregards Lijphart's warning, we analyze how the choice of a ballot structure reveals information about the diversity of these partisan purposes. Since electoral systems are gradually shifting towards more personalized competition patterns, we hope this paper helps to improve the study of electoral institutions, as well as their still-elusive implications.

Appendix

6.1 Variables and ballot paper example

Table A
Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
<i>Dependent Variable</i>				
Closed	0.212	0.409	0.000	1.000
<i>Independent Variables</i>				
Log Magnitude	1.486	0.671	0.693	2.890
Local Strength	0.071	0.095	0.000	0.505
Personal Party	0.193	0.395	0.000	1.000
Party Size	0.698	0.255	0.030	1.000
New Party	0.103	0.304	0.000	1.000
Electoral Contestation	0.210	0.182	0.029	0.814
Effective Number of Losing Parties	4.669	4.028	1	24.593
Lagged Vote Share	0.143	0.144	0.0008	0.914
Lagged Closed Ballot	0.427	0.495	0.000	1.000
Attacks	4.252	8.474	0.000	41.360
GDP per capita (2005)	6.940	5.401	0.811	33.609
Illiteracy (2005)	0.234	0.098	0.036	0.493
Locals	0.088	0.170	0.000	1.000
Local List	0.274	0.446	0.000	1.000

Table B
Variables

Variable	Description	Source
Closed List	It takes the value of 1 if the list is closed list and 0 otherwise	Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil
Log Magnitude	Logged number of legislative seats to be elected in every district.	Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil
Local Electoral Strength	Party vote share received in a given district during the previous election for Department Assembly.	Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil
Personal Party	Parties that (1) base their primary appeal on the charisma, authority, or efficacy of their leader rather than on any principles or platforms, 2) endorse outliers or independent candidates, or (3) back a candidate forming an ideological heterogeneous front (Coppedge, 1997).	Newspaper archive search
Party Size	Proportion of districts (weighted by seats) that the party presents in a given election.	Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil
New Party	It takes the value of 1 for parties for which registration date occurred during the previous three years of the elections.	Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil
Electoral Contestation	Weighted average of the number of votes that every party would need to either lose its last obtained seat or win an additional one during the previous legislative elections (Grofman and Selb, 2009).	Authors' estimations based on Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil
Effective Number of losing parties	Modification of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) for parties that did not obtain a seat.	Authors' estimations based on Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil
Lagged Vote Share	Party's lagged vote share in the district	Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil
Lagged Closed Ballot	indicates whether the party presented a closed list in a given district during the previous election	Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil
Poverty rate	Proportion of citizens in the district living below the poverty line in 2005	Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Economico
GDP per capita	Gross domestic product divided by midyear population	Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Economico
Attacks	Violent attacks in the district for every 100,000 inhabitants during the previous year of the election	Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Economico

VOTO PARA CÁMARA DE REPRESENTANTES

Espectado elector: En toda esta tarjeta electoral haga UNA SOLA MARCACIÓN siguiendo las siguientes instrucciones:

VOTO PREFERENTE: Marque el número del candidato de su preferencia.

VOTO NO PREFERENTE: Marque la agrupación política u opción de su preferencia.

CANDIDATOS CIRCUNSCRIPCIÓN BOGOTÁ D.C.

 PARTIDO OPCIÓN CIUDADANA 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118	 POLO DEMOCRÁTICO ALTERNATIVO 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118	 CENTRO DEMOCRÁTICO LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE NO PREFERENTE
 MOVIMIENTO CENTRO POR COLOMBIA LOGOSÍMBOLO PENDIENTE DE DECISIÓN POR PARTE DEL CNE NO PREFERENTE	 PARTIDO ALIANZA VERDE 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118	 MOVIMIENTO "MIRA" 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118
 PARTIDO SOCIAL DE UNIDAD NACIONAL 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118	 PARTIDO CAMBIO RADICAL 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118	 PARTIDO LIBERAL COLOMBIANO 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118
 PARTIDO UNIÓN PATRIÓTICA 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118	 PARTIDO CONSERVADOR COLOMBIANO 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118	VOTO EN BLANCO

CANDIDATOS CIRCUNSCRIPCIÓN ESPECIAL COMUNIDADES INDÍGENAS

 MUIPC 204 205 206	 AICO 204 205 206	 ASOCIACIÓN DE AUTORIDADES INDÍGENAS DE COLOMBIA LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE NO PREFERENTE	 RENOVACIÓN ÉTICA DE COLOMBIA 204 205 206	 ASIC DE AUTORIDADES INDÍGENAS DE COLOMBIA LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE NO PREFERENTE	 MOVIMIENTO ALTERNATIVO INDÍGENA Y SOCIAL 204 205 206
 UNIÓN COMUNAL DEL RESGUARDO INDÍGENA SAN JOSÉ DE LOS RÍOS LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE NO PREFERENTE	 VÍA NUEVA LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE NO PREFERENTE	 AUTORIDADES INDÍGENAS DE COLOMBIA LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE NO PREFERENTE	VOTO EN BLANCO CIRCUNSCRIPCIÓN INDÍGENAS		

CANDIDATOS CIRCUNSCRIPCIÓN ESPECIAL COMUNIDADES AFRO-DESCENDIENTES

 FUNDACIÓN ESPIRADO AFRO (EAFI) LOGOSÍMBOLO PENDIENTE DE DECISIÓN POR PARTE DEL CNE PREFERENTE	 CORPORACIÓN PODER CIUDADANO 301 302 303	 ADOPRA 301 302 303	 FUNDACIÓN INTERSIDAD LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE NO PREFERENTE	 FUNDACIÓN VIRANO DE COLOMBIA LOGOSÍMBOLO PENDIENTE DE DECISIÓN POR PARTE DEL CNE PREFERENTE	 ASIC REGIONAL DE AFROLIBANES DE LA ZONA SUR LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE PREFERENTE
 FMI DE LA ZONA SUR LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE NO PREFERENTE	 ASOCIACIÓN AFRODESCENDIENTES DE LA ZONA SUR LOGOSÍMBOLO PENDIENTE DE DECISIÓN POR PARTE DEL CNE NO PREFERENTE	 OEA ÉTICA COMUNITARIA AFRODESCENDIENTE DE LA ZONA SUR LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE PREFERENTE	 EAT ÉTICA COMUNITARIA DE LA ZONA SUR LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE NO PREFERENTE	 FUNDACIÓN FUTURO NEGRO LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE PREFERENTE	 COMITÉ CENTRO DEMOCRÁTICO LOGOSÍMBOLO PENDIENTE DE DECISIÓN POR PARTE DEL CNE NO PREFERENTE
 ASIC DE LA ZONA SUR LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE PREFERENTE	 ASIC DE LA ZONA SUR LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE PREFERENTE	 FUPROBAT LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE NO PREFERENTE	 MOVIMIENTO DE MILLONES Y OPORTUNIDADES LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE PREFERENTE	 CORPORACIÓN AFROANTIOQUEÑA LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE NO PREFERENTE	 FUNDACIÓN CULTURAL DE LA ZONA SUR LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE PREFERENTE
 ASIC DE LA ZONA SUR LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE PREFERENTE	 ASIC DE LA ZONA SUR LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE PREFERENTE	 FUNDACIÓN AFRODESCENDIENTES DE LA ZONA SUR LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE PREFERENTE	 CORP SOCIAL E INTEG DEL PACÍFICO LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE PREFERENTE	 CORP NELSON MANDELA COMANDANTE LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE NO PREFERENTE	 ASIC DE LA ZONA SUR LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE PREFERENTE
 ASIC DE LA ZONA SUR LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE PREFERENTE	 ASIC DE LA ZONA SUR LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE PREFERENTE	 ASIC DE LA ZONA SUR LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE PREFERENTE	 ASIC DE LA ZONA SUR LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE PREFERENTE	 ASIC DE LA ZONA SUR LOGOSÍMBOLO RECHAZADO POR EL CNE PREFERENTE	VOTO EN BLANCO CIRCUNSCRIPCIÓN AFRO-DESCENDIENTES

★ Logosímbolos pendientes de revisión por parte del CNE

REGISTRADURÍA NACIONAL DEL VOTO Y EL CENSO

Tarjeta Electoral fue elaborada con información preliminar de los documentos de inscripción, está sujeta de cambios posteriores al chequeo documental por parte de la RNEC y el CNE. Culaquier novedad por favor informarla al correo: eleccionescongreso2014@gmail.com

NOTA: La impresión de esta Tarjeta Electoral debe hacerse en tamaño doble-carta

Fig. A. Ballot paper for legislative elections in the district of Bogotá(2014).

Notes: This picture illustrates the ballot paper that voters in Bogotá used in the 2014 legislative elections. Source: <http://www.registraduria.gov.co/IMG/jpg/camara-bgt2014.jpg>.




Fig. B. Proportion of closed-lists in the Colombian legislative elections, 2006–2014.

Notes: This graph shows the proportion of parties running under a closed-list during the national legislative elections of 2006, 2010, and 2014. Darker colors indicate a higher proportion of closed-lists within the electoral district.

6.2 Personal parties coding

Party name	Charisma	Outliers	Heterogeneous front	Party Leader	Description	Academic Source	Other Sources
Compromiso Cívico y Cristiano por la Comunidad (C4)	✓			Jimmy Chamorro	Founded in 1990 by Jimmy Chamorro, from the movement Campus Crusade for Christ International led in Colombia by his father Nestor Chamorro. Jimmy Chamorro was elected as Senate member for four consecutive periods, from 1991 to 2006. In the 2006 legislative elections, the party did not reach the legal vote quota necessary for seat allocation and to considered officially as a party	(Duque Daza, 2010)	(Razón Pública, 2013)
Centro Democrático Mano Firme Corazón Grande	✓			Álvaro Uribe	Founded in 2014 and led by former president Álvaro Uribe Velez. The party incorporates former members of different political parties, specially the Conservative Party and U Party. Duque (2014) describes the party with a caudillista character and a very strong leading head	(Duque Daza, 2014: 320)	(Centro Democrático, 2015)
Dejen Jugar al Moreno	✓			Carlos Moreno De Caro	Founded by Moreno de Caro, known to be an eccentric character. He was been a candidate to be the Mayor of Bogotá, had been elected to Bogotá's city council, and twice to the Senate. Despite that in 2006 larger parties offered him the chance to run for the senate, he decided to stay in his own political party, knowing the difficulties to get elected after the 2003 political reform	(Rodríguez-Raga and Botero, 2006)	(Congreso Visible, 2010d; El Tiempo, 2006)
Movimiento Apertura Liberal	✓	✓		Miguel A. Flórez and José L. Flórez	Splinter party from the Liberal Party. Founded in 1992 as a regional movement, by council members of the city of Cucutá, Norte de Santander. Miguel Flórez was elected to the House in 1998, but he could not finish his term because his participation in the case of former President of the House Armando Pomárico for improper recruitment. In 2002, his brother José Luis Flórez achieved a seat in the House of Representatives. Although his political death, Miguel Flórez is still considered the natural leader of the party		(Congreso Visible, 2010c; La Silla Vacía, 2009)
Movimiento Blanco por la Paz		✓		Rene Antonio Flórez Castellanos	Flórez Castellanos is a university professor, founder of a larger civic movement called "Colombianos y colombianas por la paz" who reached the minimum number of signatures required to register candidates under a new party label for the House (Quindio) in 2014. The campaign uses social media like Facebook to convey his initiatives. At the core, its political platform supports peace negotiations		(Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 2014; Crónica del Quindio, 2014)
Movimiento Cívico Independiente (MCI)	✓			Jairo Clopatofsky	Created in 1988 and led by Jairo Clopatofsky. Clopatofsky has been a House and Senate member, and has been a candidate for Bogotá's mayor. In 2006 and 2010, Clopatofsky run for the Senate under the U Party		(Congreso Visible, 2010c; La Silla Vacía, 2016c)

(continued on next page)

(continued)

Party name	Charisma	Outliers	Heterogeneous front	Party Leader	Description	Academic Source	Other Sources
Movimiento de Inclusión y Oportunidades (MIO)	✓			Juan Carlos Martínez	Founded by former senator Juan Carlos Martínez. The party was legally created as a minority party and had received seats in congress as such. In 2011, the party change its nature of a minority party in order to participate in the local elections. Martínez led the party from prison, after being arrested for its political arrangements with paramilitary groups, after being member of the parties Alianza Democrática Nacional (ADN), Convergencia Ciudadana, and Integración Nacional (PIN)		(La Silla Vacía, 2011)
Movimiento de Integración Regional (IR)	✓			Julio Gallardo	Founded by Adalberto Gallardo (1921–2010), former intendant and House representative for the district of San Andres and Providence. Gallardo is known to be a member of one of the elite families of the Island with political and economic power, with close ties to the Conservative Party. The leadership of the party was succeeded by his son, Julio Cesar Gallardo, a House member with longest tenure in the recent history of the district. The party was created in 1998 in San Andres island as a regional political movement from the traditional Conservative Party. Its political goals aims to integrate the Islands to the mainland for the development of tourism	(Abadía Valencia, 2016; Duque Daza, 2006)	(El Tiempo, 1995)
Movimiento de Salvación Nacional	✓		✓	Álvaro Gómez Hurtado	Splinter party from the Conservative Party, created in 1990 by Álvaro Gómez Hurtado in order to run on the presidential elections achieving the second place. Gómez was assassinated in 1995. In the 1998 and 2002 legislative elections the movement got a seat in the Senate, and finally dissolved in 2006	(Duque Daza, 2006: footnote 7)	(El Espectador, 2014)
Movimiento Político Cien por Ciento por Colombia	✓			Yahir Acuña	Founded by former senator Yahir Acuña. The party was legally created as a minority party, Afrovides, and had received seats in congress as such. In 2013, the party change its nature to participate in the upcoming legislative elections. The party's head is Acuña and its board is integrated by members of his family. Nowadays, Acuña is under investigation for his political involvement with paramilitary groups		(Semana, 2013)
Movimiento Popular Unido (MPU)	✓			Carlos Herney Abadía	Founded in 2001 by former senator Carlos Herney Abadía, sentenced for his involvement surrounding the acceptance of drug money for the 1994 presidential campaign of the liberal candidate, Ernesto Samper. The party ran in the 2006 and 2010 legislative elections. By 2011 the party dissolved and some of its members became part of the Movimiento de Inclusión y Oportunidades (MIO). Abadía supported his son political career as council member and governor the district of Valle, as well as the beginning of Juan Carlos Martínez political career	(Giraldo and Muñoz, 2014b)	(El País, 2010)
Movimiento Renovador de Acción Laboral MORAL	✓			Miguel Pinedo	Splinter party from the Liberal party, founded by Miguel Pinedo. Pinedo advertise the party as a place where expelled members from other parties could run	(Guzmán and Roll, 2005: 40)	(La Silla Vacía, 2015)
Partido Colombia Democrática	✓	✓		Mario Uribe and William Vélez	Founded in 2003. The party had the goal to support the former president Álvaro Uribe, cousin of Mario Uribe	(Gómez et al., 2006: 20)	(Congreso Visible, 2010a,b)
Partido Social De Unidad Nacional Partido De La U	✓		✓	Álvaro Uribe	Splinter party from the Liberal party founded in 2003 under the leadership of Juan Manuel Santos, with the purpose of supporting the former president Álvaro Vélez reelection campaign for the 2004 election. Internal party splits, scandals due to the relationships of some of its members with paramilitary groups and a split between Santos and Uribe led for this party to not follow former president Uribe	(Rodríguez-Raga and Botero, 2006)	(Semana, 2009)
Por El País Que Soñamos	✓			Enrique Peñalosa	Founded by Enrique Peñalosa. The party is conformed by former members of different parties, mainly the Liberal Party. Had been mayor of Bogotá in multiple occasions, senate candidate, and presidential candidate under the Partido Verde label. In 2006, Por el País que Soñamos ran in the legislative elections. While it won two seats in the House, it did not obtain enough votes to remain as a legal party. The party dissolved and Peñalosa joined the Partido Verde	(Rodríguez-Raga and Botero, 2006)	(La Silla Vacía, 2016b)
		✓	✓				

(continued)

Party name	Charisma	Outliers	Heterogeneous front	Party Leader	Description	Academic Source	Other Sources
Por un Huila Mejor				Rodrigo Villalba	Driven by the senator Rodrigo Villalba, Por un Huila Mejor is an alliance between the Green and the Liberal party for the 2014 legislative elections in the district of Huila. It is based on local leadership that concede them at least two of the four places in the House of Representatives. It fosters a local policy based on unity and defense of the region, protection of the agrarian sector, environmental policies, and support the peace process		(Villaba, 2013; La Silla Vacía, 2014)
Unidad Liberal	✓	✓		Luis Enrique Dussan	Unidad Liberal ran in the 2010 legislative elections through the recollection of signatures. The initiative was led by Luis Enrique Dussan and backed by the Liberal Party. Dussan is a member of the party Nuevo Liberalismo, splinter party of the Liberal Party. Although Dussan considered himself a member of the Liberal Party, he also supported Álvaro Uribe's and Juan Manuel Santos' presidential campaigns	Guzmán and Roll 2005: 40	(La Silla Vacía, 2010)
Visionarios con Antanas	✓			Antanas Mockus	Founded by Antanas Mockus in 2006. Mockus has been mayor of Bogotá and presidential candidate under the party label of Visionarios and the Partido Verde. Although the party achieve seats in the 2006 legislative elections, the party did not get enough votes to be legally recognize as a party in congress. Eventually, Mockus joined the Partido Verde	(Rodríguez-Raga and Botero, 2006)	(La Silla Vacía, 2016a)

6.3 Results full table

Table C

Coefficients estimates (and Standard Errors) for the selection of the closed ballot. full results

	Dependent variable: Closed List			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log Magnitude	−1.008*** (0.310)			−1.345*** (0.342)
Local Strength		−3.947** (1.851)		−3.749** (1.844)
Personal Party			1.272** (0.591)	1.029* (0.572)
Party Size	−2.421*** (0.747)	−2.388*** (0.738)	−2.393*** (0.755)	−2.385*** (0.737)
New Party	−0.111 (0.509)	−0.294 (0.510)	−0.640 (0.582)	−0.623 (0.574)
Electoral Contestation	−0.134 (1.282)	0.057 (1.334)	0.072 (1.337)	−0.534 (1.296)
Effective Number of Losing Parties	−0.047 (0.045)	−0.080* (0.044)	−0.080* (0.044)	−0.317** (0.148)
Log GDP per capita	−0.092 (0.160)	−0.275 (0.179)	−0.270 (0.179)	−0.091 (0.154)
Illiteracy	0.879 (1.715)	2.896 (1.864)	3.051 (1.859)	0.725 (1.646)
Guerrilla Attacks	−0.281 (0.202)	−0.200 (0.207)	−0.204 (0.207)	−0.223 (0.203)
Log Magnitude × Effective Number of Losing Parties				0.106* (0.055)
Constant	1.808* (1.085)	0.034 (0.992)	−0.448 (1.012)	2.626** (1.195)
σ_p	1.610	1.555	1.633	1.541
σ_d	0.664	0.861	0.856	0.606
Observations	944	944	944	944
Parties	48	48	48	48
Districts	33	33	33	33
Log Likelihood	−381.483	−383.720	−383.582	−375.482
Akaike Inf. Crit.	788.966	793.440	793.163	782.964
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	852.018	856.492	856.215	860.566

Notes: Estimates are based on logistic regressions. All models include the logged values for GDP per capita, poverty rates, and homicide rates in the district, as well as fixed effects for election-year. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; and * is significant at the 10% level.

6.4 Robustness checks

Table D

Coefficients estimates (and Standard Errors) for the selection of the closed ballot. Robustness checks. full results

	Dependent variable: Closed List				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Log Magnitude	−1.672*** (0.522)	−2.021*** (0.548)	−1.336*** (0.342)	−1.306*** (0.346)	−1.347*** (0.340)
Local Strength	−0.787*** (0.272)	−0.476** (0.228)	−0.327* (0.177)	−0.383** (0.177)	−0.358** (0.181)
Personal Party	−0.305 (0.851)	−0.305 (0.880)	1.025* (0.566)	1.008* (0.581)	1.034* (0.579)
Party Size	−0.290 (0.285)	−0.234 (0.290)	−0.606*** (0.187)	−0.604*** (0.191)	−0.595*** (0.190)
Electoral Contestation	−0.079 (0.449)	−0.008 (0.456)	−0.088 (0.236)	−0.076 (0.238)	−0.105 (0.236)
Effective Number of Losing Parties	−0.475* (0.244)	−0.564** (0.250)	−0.313** (0.148)	−0.298** (0.150)	−0.321** (0.148)
Attacks	0.200 (0.391)	0.290 (0.402)	−0.222 (0.203)	−0.208 (0.205)	−0.222 (0.203)
GDP	−0.095 (0.216)	−0.100 (0.227)	−0.088 (0.154)	−0.090 (0.156)	−0.096 (0.153)
Illiteracy	−0.065 (0.224)	−0.053 (0.241)	0.070 (0.162)	0.082 (0.164)	0.086 (0.161)
Log Magnitude × Effective Number of Losing Parties	0.171* (0.090)	0.202** (0.093)	0.104* (0.055)	0.100* (0.055)	0.109** (0.055)
New Party			−0.587 (0.572)	−0.635 (0.580)	−0.619 (0.578)
Lagged Vote Share	0.608** (0.250)				
Lagged Closed		−0.746 (0.562)			
Locals			−0.689 (0.704)		
Incumbents				1.409* (0.841)	
Top Local					0.126 (0.276)
σ_p	1.184	1.247	1.516	1.579	1.570
σ_d	0.663	0.797	0.606	0.617	0.596
Observations	489	489	944	944	944
Parties	25	25	48	48	48
Districts	33	33	33	33	33
Log Likelihood	−153.995	−156.304	−375.007	−374.155	−373.725
Akaike Inf. Crit.	339.989	344.608	784.014	782.310	781.451
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	407.067	411.686	866.466	864.762	863.794

Notes: Estimates are based on logistic regressions. All models include the logged values for GDP per capita, poverty rates, and homicide rates in the district, as well as fixed effects for election-year. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; and * is significant at the 10% level.

Table E

Coefficients estimates (and Standard Errors) for the selection of the closed ballot. alternative specifications

	Dependent variable: Closed List				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Log Magnitude	−1.143*** (0.339)	−0.969*** (0.348)	−1.082*** (0.358)	−1.363*** (0.340)	−1.173*** (0.379)
Local Strength	−0.306* (0.176)	−0.336* (0.183)	−0.358* (0.183)	−0.331* (0.175)	−0.354** (0.174)
Personal Party	1.037* (0.564)	1.128* (0.582)	1.089* (0.587)	0.721 (0.530)	1.016* (0.571)
Party Size	−2.451*** (0.731)	−2.815*** (0.768)	−2.417*** (0.754)	−2.262*** (0.730)	−2.384*** (0.736)
Electoral Contestation	−0.094 (0.233)	−0.144 (0.242)	−0.102 (0.237)	−0.482 (1.285)	−0.075 (1.368)
Effective Number of Losing Parties	−0.314** (0.146)	−0.277* (0.150)	−0.310** (0.149)	−0.318** (0.147)	−0.273* (0.155)
Log Magnitude × Effective Number of Losing Parties	0.103* (0.054)	0.089 (0.055)	0.101* (0.055)	0.107** (0.054)	0.076 (0.062)
GDP	−0.096 (0.148)	−0.081 (0.153)	−0.091 (0.155)	−0.090 (0.153)	−0.129 (0.159)

Table E (continued)

	Dependent variable: Closed List				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Illiteracy	0.061 (0.156)	0.114 (0.162)	0.085 (0.163)	0.704 (1.635)	0.786 (1.662)
Attacks	–0.201 (0.201)	–0.149 (0.207)	–0.175 (0.205)	–0.232 (0.202)	–0.983 (0.725)
New Party	–0.558 (0.572)	–0.631 (0.590)	–0.654 (0.584)		–0.609 (0.575)
Lagged Vote Share	0.613** (0.242)				
Locals	3.824** (1.856)				
Incumbents		18.925*** (4.886)			
Top Local			1.549** (0.605)		
Log Magnitude × Locals	–4.542** (1.814)				
Log Magnitude × Incumbents		–22.673*** (6.651)			
Log Magnitude × Top Local			–1.182** (0.466)		
Party Age				–0.073 (0.258)	
Attacks ²)					0.604 (0.552)
Constant	2.293*** (0.889)	2.029** (0.926)	1.984** (0.932)	2.457* (1.292)	2.212* (1.209)
σ_p	1.184	1.247	1.516	1.579	1.570
σ_d	0.663	0.797	0.606	0.617	0.596
Observations	944	944	944	944	944
Parties	25	25	48	48	48
Districts	33	33	33	33	33
Log Likelihood	–371.595	–359.197	–370.082	–376.050	–374.896
Akaike Inf. Crit.	779.189	754.393	776.164	784.100	783.793
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	866.492	841.695	863.351	861.702	866.245

Notes: Estimates are based on logistic regressions. All models include control variables at the party (*New Party* and *Party Size*) and district level (*Electoral Competition*, the *Effective Number of Losing Parties*, *GDP per capita*, *Literacy Rate*, and *Homicide Rates*), as well as fixed effects for election-year. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; and * is significant at the 10% level.

Table F

Coefficients estimates (and Standard Errors) for the selection of the closed ballot. Results using propensity score matching

	(1)	(2)
Log Magnitude	–0.973*** (0.175)	
District Magnitude<5		–0.761*** (0.211)
Local Strength	–5.083*** (1.595)	–4.851*** (1.622)
Personal Party	0.595*** (0.213)	0.574*** (0.212)
Electoral Contestation	–0.966* (0.535)	–1.037** (0.521)
Party Size	–1.399*** (0.362)	–1.308*** (0.366)
New Party	0.045 (0.276)	–0.026 (0.269)
Literacy Rate	0.877 (0.980)	2.426** (1.043)
GDP per capita	0.015 (0.016)	0.025 (0.017)
Constant	0.998* (0.522)	–0.608 (0.458)
Observations	944	944
AIC	2495.747	2567.761

Notes: Estimates are based on logistic regressions. All models include the logged values for GDP per capita, poverty rates, and homicide rates in the district, as well as fixed effects for election-year. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; and * is significant at the 10% level.

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