

## Seminar in Comparative Elections

POLS 6322

Wednesday

5:30-8:30 p.m.

PGH 310

University of Houston

Fall 2016

Francisco Cantú

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Office Hours: Friday 3-5 P.M.

This is a graduate-level seminar on the political economy of elections. We will examine the interaction between voters and political representatives across different types of electoral rules, political institutions, and contextual factors. Students will read and discuss both classic readings and recent works on a non-exhaustive list of topics. The scope of these readings will cover analytical models and empirical studies by political scientists and economists. The course requires familiarity with statistics (OLS) and research design.

The course is divided into four sections. The first part reviews the basic theories of electoral accountability and representation. The second part of the course is a survey of electoral institutions. We will examine the different ways in which votes translate into seats, and discuss the causes and consequences of electoral rules. The third part of the course assesses different models of voter behavior, with a particular emphasis on the theoretical and empirical challenges of each approach. The final part of the course covers a subset of issues undermining electoral quality.

### Requirements

*Memos (10%):* Before coming to class, you will write a brief (1-2 page) memo discussing a topic or question arising from the week's readings. These memos will help me focus the class discussion as well as keep you accountable and prepared for class. You need to submit a memo for at least seven sessions, and you should upload it to Blackboard by 5 p.m. the day before class.

*Participation (40%):* I take for granted that you have a basic interest in the material and an enthusiastic attitude toward participation. Therefore, I expect you to attend each meeting, do the reading thoroughly and in advance, and participate actively in class. You should be prepared to discuss each piece at the assigned seminar and beyond the requirements as much as possible. Also, you will prepare and deliver a conference-like presentation about one of the assigned articles during the semester. I will provide more details about this activity during the first session.

*Research Proposal (50%):* As a final assignment for the course, you will submit a 10-12 page research proposal displaying an original idea on one of the topics discussed during the seminar. The proposal should contain a brief survey of the literature of the theme and then describe a theoretical argument and a research design to test it. Throughout the semester, we will discuss how to work on this project, and you should submit a one-page outline of the paper by November 3, including the preliminary hypotheses, and a brief description of the research design. The research proposal is due on December 14 at noon.

### Course Policies

*Electronic Devices:* Laptops are not allowed during class meetings. Make sure to print out the readings before class.

*Deadlines and Extensions:* Unless very pressing (and fully documented) situations, extensions are not allowed.

*Disabilities:* If you have a disability that requires special testing accommodations or other classroom modifications, you need to notify both me and the Center for Students with DisAbilities (CSD).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup><http://www.uh.edu/csd/>

You may be asked to provide documentation of your disability to determine the appropriate accommodations.

*Academic Integrity:* There is a zero tolerance policy for plagiarism in any of the required activities for this course, and any violation will be penalized in the terms cited by the UH's Academic Dishonesty Policy.<sup>2</sup>

### **Course Materials**

All the published articles are available through JSTOR. Book chapters are available via Blackboard or at the library.

I encourage you to purchase the following book as a companion for the readings assigned in the course:

Angrist, J. D. and Pischke, J.-S. (2014). *Mastering 'Metrics: The Path from Cause to Effect*. Princeton University Press.

Items under *Read* are required for the seminar. *Further reading* includes articles referred to in class and related pieces on the topic that will help you to prepare your qualifying exams. If possible, read the required material in the order indicated.

## **I. Introduction**

### **August 24. Seminar Motivation and Logistics**

#### **Read:**

Shepsle, K. A. (2010). *Analyzing Politics*. W.W. Norton & Co. Chapter 4

Riker, W. H. (1982). *Liberalism Against Populism*. Waveland Press. Chapter 1

Przeworski, A. (1999). Minimalist conception of democracy: A defense. In Shapiro, I. and Hacker-Cordón, C., editors, *Democracy's Value*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

### **August 31. Electoral Accountability and Representation**

#### **Read:**

Przeworski, A., Stokes, S., and Manin, B. (1999). Introduction. In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge University Press, New York

Fearon, J. (1999). Electoral accountability and the control of politicians. In Przeworski, A., Manin, B., and Stokes, S., editors, *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge University Press

Huber, J. D. and Powell, B. G. (1994). Congruence between citizens and policymakers in two visions of liberal democracy. *World Politics*, 46(3):291–326

Gottlieb, J. (2015). Greater expectations: A field experiment to improve accountability in Mali. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(1):143–157

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<sup>2</sup><http://www.uh.edu/academics/catalog/policies/academ-reg/academic-honesty/>

**Further reading:**

- Pitkin, H. F. (1967). *The Concept of Representation*. University of California Press, Berkeley
- Ferejohn, J. (1986). Incumbent performance and electoral control. *Public Choice*, 50(1-3):5–25
- Besley, T. (2006). *Principled Agents?* Cambridge University Press
- Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1997). Separation of powers and political accountability. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(4):1163–1202
- Lee, D. S., Moretti, E., and Butler, M. J. (2004). Do voters affect or elect policies? Evidence from the U. S. House. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(3):807–859
- Miller, G. (2008). Women’s suffrage, political responsiveness, and child survival in American history. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(3):1287–1327
- Key, V. (1966). *The Responsible Electorate*. Vintage Books
- Strøm, K. (2000). Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies. *European Journal of Political Research*, 37(3):261–290

## II. Electoral Institutions

### September 7. Introduction

**Read:**

- Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P., editors (2005). *The Politics of Electoral Systems*. Oxford University Press. Chapter 1 and Appendices A-C
- Taagepera, R. (2007). *Predicting Party Sizes*. Oxford University Press. Chapters 2-3
- Shugart, M. S. and Wattenberg, M. P. (2002). Mixed-member electoral systems: A definition and typology. In Shugart, M. S. and Wattenberg, M. P., editors, *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds*, chapter 1, pages 9–24. Oxford University Press, London
- Bormann, N.-C. and Golder, M. (2013). Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946-2011. *Electoral Studies*, (32):360–369

**Further reading:**

- Cox, G. W. (2005). Electoral institutions and party competitions. In Menard, C. and Shirley, M. M., editors, *Handbook of New Institutional Economics*. Springer
- Carey, J. M. and Hix, S. (2011). The electoral sweet spot: Low-magnitude proportional electoral systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2):382–397
- Reynolds, A., Reilly, B., and Ellis, A. (2005). *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm
- Norris, P. (2004). *Electoral Engineering*. Cambridge University Press

- Lakeman, E. and Lambert, J. (1955). *Voting in Democracies: A Study of Majority and Proportional Electoral Systems*. Faber and Faber, London
- Lijphart, A. (1994). *Electoral systems and party systems: A study of twenty-seven democracies*. Oxford University Press, Oxford
- Taagepera, R. and Shugart, M. S. (1989). *Seats and Votes*. Yale University Press, New Haven
- Farrell, D. M. (2001). *Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction*. Palgrave, Houndmills

## September 14. The Consequences of Electoral Rules I: Strategic Voting

### Read:

- Duverger, M. (1954). *Political Parties*. Wiley, New York. Book II, Chapter 1
- Cox, G. W. (1997). *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2, 4-5
- Spenkuch, J. L. (2014). Please don't vote for me: Voting in a natural experiment with perverse incentives. *The Economic Journal*, 125:1025–1052
- Potter, J. D. (Forthcoming). Constituency diversity, district magnitude and voter coordination. *British Journal of Political Science*

### Further reading:

- Chhibber, P. and Kollman, K. (1998). Party aggregation and the number of parties in India and the United States. *The American Political Science Review*, 92(2):329–342
- Clark, W. R. and Golder, M. (2006). Rehabilitating Duverger's law: Testing the mechanical and strategic modifying effects of electoral laws. *Comparative Political Studies*, 39:679–708
- Blais, A., Lachat, R., Hino, A., and Doray-Demers, P. (2011). The mechanical and psychological effects of electoral systems: A quasi-experimental study. *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(12):1599–1621
- Alvarez, R. M., Boehmke, F. J., and Nagler, J. (2006). Strategic voting in British elections. *Electoral Studies*, 25(1):1–19
- Cox, G. W. and Shugart, M. S. (1996). Strategic voting under proportional representation. *Journal of Law Economics and Organization*, 12(2):299–324

## September 21. The Consequences of Electoral Rules II: Mechanical Effects

### Read:

- Li, Y. and Shugart, M. S. (2016). The seat product model of the effective number of parties: A case for applied political science. *Electoral Studies*, 41:23–34
- Calvo, E. and Rodden, J. A. (2015). The Achilles heel of plurality systems: Geography and representation in multiparty democracies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(4):789–805
- André, A., Depauw, S., and Martin, S. (2016). The classification of electoral systems: Bringing legislators back in. *Electoral Studies*, 42:42–53
- Dinas, E., Riera, P., and Roussias, N. (2015). Staying in the first league: Parliamentary representation and the electoral success of small parties. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 3(2):187–204

**Further reading:**

- Myerson, R. B. (1993). Incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems. *The American Political Science Review*, 87(4):856–869
- Osborne, M. J. and Slivinski, A. (1996). A model of political competition with citizen-candidates. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 111(1):65–96
- Monrow, B. L. and Rose, A. G. (2002). Electoral systems and unimagined consequences: Partisan effects of distorted proportional representation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(1):67–89
- Carey, J. M. and Shugart, M. S. (1995). Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: a rank ordering of electoral formulas. *Electoral Studies*, 14(4):417–439
- Rae, D. (1971). *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. Yale University Press, New Haven
- Cox, G. W. (1990). Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 34(4):903–936
- Katz, R. S. (1986). Intrapreference party voting. In Grofman, B. and Lijphart, A., editors, *Electoral laws and their political consequences*, pages 85–103. Agathon Press, New York

**September 28. The Consequences of Electoral Rules III: Indirect Effects****Read:**

- Carey, J. M. (2007). Competing principals, political institutions, and party unity in legislative voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1):92–107
- Iversen, T. and Soskice, D. (2006). Electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions: Why some democracies redistribute more than others. *American Political Science Review*, 100(2):165–82
- Beath, A., Christia, F., Egorov, G., and Enikolopov, R. (2016). Electoral rules and political selection: Theory and evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan. *Review of Economic Studies*, 83:932–968
- Desposato, S. W. (2006). The impact of electoral rules on legislative parties: Lessons from the Brazilian senate and chamber of deputies. *Journal of Politics*, 68(4):1018–1030

**Further reading:**

- Moser, R. G. and Scheiner, E. (2012). *Electoral Systems and Political Context: How the Effects of Rules Vary Across New and Established Democracies*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Chapters 1 and 8
- Calvo, E. and Hellwig, T. (2011). Centripetal and centrifugal incentives under different electoral systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(1):27–41
- Rickard, S. J. (2012). Electoral systems, voters' interests and geographic dispersion. *British Journal of Political Science*, 42(4):855–877
- Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2003). *The Economic Effect of Constitutions*. MIT Press
- Powell, B. G. (2009). The ideological congruence controversy. *Comparative Political Studies*, 42:1475–1497
- Grofman, B. and Lijphart, A., editors (1984). *Electoral laws and their political consequences*. Agathon Press, New York

## October 5. Electoral Rules as Dependent Variable

### Read:

- Rokkan, S. (1970[2009]). *Citizens, Elections, Parties*. ECPR Press. Pages 147-168.
- Calvo, E. (2009). The competitive road to proportional representation: Partisan biases and electoral regime change under increasing party competition. *World Politics*, 61(2)
- Leeman, L. and Mares, I. (2014). The adoption of proportional representation. *Journal of Politics*, 76(2):461–478
- Renwick, A. and Pilet, J.-B. (2016). *Faces on the Ballot: The Personalization of Electoral Systems in Europe*. Oxford University Press. Chapters 2 and 4

### Further reading:

- Colomer, J. M. (2004). The strategy and history of electoral system choice. In *Handbook of Electoral System Choice*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York
- Katz, R. S. (2005). Why are there so many (or so few) electoral reforms? In Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P., editors, *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, pages 57–76. Oxford University Press, New York
- Blais, A., editor (2008). *To Keep or to Change first Past the Post? The Politics of Electoral Reform*. Oxford University Press, New York
- Benoit, K. (2004). Models of electoral system change. *Electoral Studies*, 23(3):363–89
- Boix, C. (1999). Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 93(3)
- Cusak, T., Iversen, T., and Soskice, D. (2007). Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems. *American Political Science Review*, 101(3):373–391
- Przeworski, A. (2008). Conquered or granted? a history of suffrage extensions. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(2):291–321
- Blais, A., Dobrzynska, A., and Indridason, I. H. (2004). To adopt or not to adopt proportional representation: The politics of institutional choice. *British Journal of Political Science*, 35:182–190
- Andrews, J. T. and Jackman, R. W. (2005). Strategic fools: electoral rule choice under extreme uncertainty. *Electoral Studies*, (24):65–84

## III. Voting Behavior

### October 12. Economic Voting

#### Read:

- Przeworski, A. and Sprague, J. (1986). *Paper Stones*. The University of Chicago Press. Chapters 2-4
- Powell, G. B. and Whitten, G. D. (1993). A cross-national analysis of economic voting: Taking account of the political context. *American Journal of Political Science*, 37(2):391–414

- Manacorda, M., Miguel, E., and Vigorito, A. (2011). Government transfers and political support. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, (3):1–28
- Alt, J. E., Lassen, D. D., and Marshall, J. (2015). Credible sources and sophisticated voters: When does new information induce economic voting? *Journal of Politics*, 78(2):327–342

**Further reading:**

- Tucker, J. (2006). *Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, 1990-1999*. Cambridge University Press.
- Duch, R. M. and Stevenson, R. M. (2008). *The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Kayser, M. A. and Wlezien, C. (50). Performance pressure: Patterns of partisanship and the economic vote. *European Journal of Political Research*, 3(365-94)
- Anderson, C. J. (2000). Economic voting and political context: A comparative perspective. *Electoral Studies*, 19(2-3):183–97
- Stokes, S. (2001). Public opinion of market reforms: A framework. In Stokes, S., editor, *Public Support for market reforms in new democracies*. Cambridge University Press
- Tufte, E. R. (1975). Determinants of the outcomes of midterm congressional elections. *American Political Science Review*, 69(3):812–26
- Fiorina, M. (1981). *Retrospective Voting in American Elections*. Yale University Press
- MacKuen, Michael B., R. S. E. (1992). Peasants or bankers? The American electorate and the U.S. economy. *American Political Science Review*, 86(3):597–611
- Cheibub, J. A. (2006). Presidentialism, electoral identifiability, and budget balances in democratic systems. *American Political Science Review*, 100(3)

**October 19. Spatial Voting**

**Assumed:**

- Downs, A. (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Harper & Row Publishers

**Quick reading:**

- Queralt, D. (2012). Spatial voting in Spain. *South European Society and Politics*, 17(3):375–392 (check replication code in Blackboard)

**Read:**

- Iversen, T. (1994b). Political leadership and representation in West European democracies: A test of three models of voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 38(1):45–74
- Kedar, O. (2005). When moderate voters prefer extreme parties: Policy balancing in parliamentary elections. *American Political Science Review*, 99(2):185–199
- Lachat, R. (2015). The role of party identification in spatial models of voting choice. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 3(3):641–658
- Franchino, F. and Zucchini, F. (2015). Voting in a multi-dimensional space: A conjoint analysis employing valence and ideology attributes of candidates. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 3(2):221–241

**Further reading:**

- Westholm, A. (1997). Distance vs. direction: the illusory defeat of the proximity theory of electoral choice. *American Journal of Political Science*, 91(4):865–885
- Lewis, J. B. (2001). Estimating voter preference distributions from individual-level voting data. *Political Analysis*, 9(3):275–297
- Lewis, J. B. and King, G. (1999). No evidence on directional vs. proximity voting. *Political Analysis*, 8(1):21–33
- Tomz, M. and Houweling, R. P. V. (2008). Candidate positioning and voter choice. *American Political Science Review*, 102(3):303–318
- Alesina, A. (1988). Credibility and policy convergence in a two-party system with rational voters. *The American Economic Review*, 78(4):796–805
- Adams, J. F., Merrill, S., and Grofman, B. (1999). *A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Rivers, D. (1988). Heterogeneity in models of electoral choice. *American Journal of Political Science*, 32(737-57)
- Iversen, T. (1994a). The logics of electoral politics: Spatial, directional, and mobilizational effects. *Comparative Political Studies*, 27(21):55–189
- Rabinowitz, G. and Macdonald, S. E. (1989). A directional theory of issue voting. *American Political Science Review*, 83(1):93–121

**October 26. Ethnic Voting****Read:**

- Chandra, K. (2004). *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2-4
- Reilly, B. (2001). *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and 4
- Casey, K. (2015). Crossing party lines: The effects of information on redistributive politics. *American Economic Review*, 105(6):2410–2448
- Michelitch, K. (2015). Does electoral competition exacerbate interethnic or interpartisan economic discrimination? *American Political Science Review*, 109(1):43–61

**Further reading:**

- Geertz, C. (1973). *The Interpretations of Culture*. Basic Books
- Horowitz, D. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. University of California Press, Berkeley
- Horowitz, D. L. (2002). Constitutional design: proposals versus processes. *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*, pages 15–36
- Wilkinson, S. I. (2004). *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge



- Abrajano, M. A. and Alvarez, R. M. (2005). A natural experiment of race-based and issue voting: The 2001 City of Los Angeles elections. *Political Research Quarterly*, 58(2):203–218
- Chauchard, S. (2014). Can descriptive representation change beliefs about a stigmatized group? Evidence from rural India. *American Political Science Review*, 108(2):403–422
- Ferree, K. (2006). Explaining South Africa’s racial census. *Journal of Politics*, 68(4):803–815
- Conroy-Krutz, J. (2013). Information and ethnic politics in Africa. *British Journal of Political Science*, 43(2):345–373
- Eifert, B., Miguel, T., and Posner, D. (2010). Political competition and ethnic identification in Africa. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(2):494–510
- Dunning, T. and Harrison, L. (2010). Cross-cutting cleavages and ethnic voting: An experimental study of cousinage in Mali. *American Political Science Review*, 104(1):1–19

## November 2. Information

### Read:

- Alvarez, R. M. (1997). *Information and Elections*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. Chapters 2 and 3.
- Pande, R. (2011). Can informed voters enforce better governance? experiments in low-income democracies. *Annual Review of Economics*, 3:215–37
- McDonald Ladd, J. and Lenz, G. S. (2009). Exploiting a rare communication shift to document the persuasive power of the news media. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2):394–410
- Kendall, C., Nannicini, T., and Trebbi, F. (2016). How do voters respond to information? Evidence from a randomized campaign. *American Economic Review*, 105(1):322–353

### Further reading:

- Lupia, A. and McCubbins, M. (1998). *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?* Cambridge University Press
- DellaVigna, S. and Kaplan, E. (2007). The Fox News effect: Media bias and voting. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(3):1187–1234
- Snyder, J. M. and Strömberg, D. (2010). Press coverage and political accountability. *Journal of Political Economy*, 118(2):355–408
- Vavreck, L. (2007). The exaggerated effects of advertising on turnout: The dangers of self-reports. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 2(4):325–343
- Gerber, A. S., Karlan, D., and Bergan, D. (2009). Does the media matter? A field experiment measuring the effect of newspapers on voting behavior and political opinions. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 1(2):35–52
- Lupia, A., Levine, A. S., Menning, J. O., and Sin, G. (2007). Were Bush tax cut supporters “simply ignorant?” A second look at conservatives and liberals in “Homer gets a tax cut”. *Perspectives on Politics*, (4):773–784

- Besley, T. and Burgess, R. (2002). The political economy of government responsiveness: Theory and evidence from India. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4)
- Ferraz, C. and Finan, F. (2011). Electoral accountability and corruption: Evidence from the audits of local governments. *American Economic Review*, 101(4):1274–1311
- Boas, T. C. and Hidalgo, F. D. (2011). Controlling the airwaves: Incumbency advantage and community radio in Brazil. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(4):869–885
- Enikopolov, R., Petrivá, M., and Zhuravskaya, E. (2011). Media and political persuasion: Evidence from Russia. *American Economic Review*, 101(7):3253–85

## IV. Electoral Quality

### November 9. Elections in Dictatorships

#### Read:

- Hermet, G. (1978). State-controlled elections: a framework. In Hermet, G., Rose, R., and Rouquié, A., editors, *Elections without choice*, pages 1–18. The Macmillan Press LTD, london edition
- Blaydes, L. A. (2011). *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Chapters 1-3
- Malesky, E. J. (2009). Gerrymandering – Vietnamese style: Escaping the partial reform equilibrium in a nondemocratic regime. *Journal of Politics*, 71(1):132–159
- Reuter, O. J. and Robertson, G. B. (2012). Subnational appointments in authoritarian regimes: Evidence from russian gubernatorial appointments. *The Journal of Politics*, 74(4):1023–1037

#### Further reading:

- Magaloni, B. (2006). *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1
- Cox, G. W. (2009). Authoritarian elections and leadership succession, 1975-2000. Working Paper
- Gandhi, J. and Lust-Okar, E. (2009). Elections under authoritarianism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, (12):403–422
- Svolik, M. W. (2012). *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 6
- Schedler, A. (2013). *The Politics of Uncertainty*. Oxford University Press, New York
- Díaz-Cayeros, A., Magaloni, B., and Weingast, B. W. (2003). Tragic brilliance: Equilibrium hegemony and democratization in Mexico. Working Paper
- Lust-Okar, E. (2005). *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World. Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Truex, R. (2014). The returns to office in a “rubber stamp” parliament. *American Political Science Review*, 108(2):235–251

- Gandhi, J. (2014). The role of presidential power in authoritarian elections. In Ginsburg, T. and Simpser, A., editors, *Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes*. Cambridge University Press
- Malesky, E. J. and Schuler, P. (2011). The single-party dictator's dilemma: Information in elections without opposition. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 36(4):491–530
- Posada-Carbó, E., editor (1996). *Elections before Democracy: The History of Elections in Europe and Latin America*. Macmillan Press LTD, London
- Levitsky, S. and Way, L. A. (2010). *Competitive Authoritarianism*. Cambridge University Press, New York
- Boix, C. and Svobik, M. W. (2013). The foundations of limited authoritarian government: Institutions, commitment, and power-sharing in dictatorships. *Journal of Politics*, 75(2):300–316

## November 16. Vote Buying

### Read:

- Stokes, S., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M., and Brusco, V. (2013). *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism*. Cambridge University Press, New York. Chapters 1-2
- Calvo, E. and Murillo, M. V. (2013). When parties meet voters: Assessing political linkages through partisan networks and distributive expectations in argentina and chile. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(7):851–882
- Cruz, C., Keefer, P., and Labonne, J. (2015). incumbent advantage, voter information and vote buying. Working Paper
- Gottlieb, J. and Larreguy, H. (2016). An informational theory of electoral targeting in clientelistic contexts: Evidence from senegal. Working Paper

### Further reading:

- Díaz-Cayeros, A., Estévez, F., and Magaloni, B. (2016). *The Political Logic of Poverty Relief: Electoral Strategies and Social Policy in Mexico*. Cambridge University Press
- Gonzalez-Ocantos, E., Kiewiet de Jonge, C., Melendez, C., Osorio, J., and Nickerson, D. W. (2012). Vote buying and social desirability bias: Experimental evidence from Nicaragua. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(1):202–217
- Gans-Morse, J., Mazzuca, S., and Nichter, S. (2014). Varieties of clientelism: Machine politics during elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(2):415–432
- Larreguy, H., Marshall, J., and Querubin, P. (2016). Parties, brokers and voter mobilization: How turnout buying depends upon the party's capacity to monitor brokers. *American Political Science Review*, 10(1):160–179
- Nichter, S. (2008). Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret ballot. *American Political Science Review*, 102(1):19–31
- Albertus, M. (2013). Vote buying with multiple distributive goods. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(9):1082–1111

- Vicente, P. C. and Wantchekon, L. (2009). Clientelism and vote buying: lessons from field experiments in African elections. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 25(2):292–305
- Weitz-Shapiro, R. (2012). What wins votes: Why some politicians opt out of clientelism. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(3):568–583
- Finan, F. and Schechter, L. (2012). Vote-buying and reciprocity. *Econometrica*, 80(2):863–881
- Wantchekon, L. (2003). Clientelism and voting behavior. evidence from a field experiment in Benin. *World Politics*, (55):399–422
- Nichter, S. (2014). Conceptualizing vote buying. *Electoral Studies*, 35:315–327
- Cox, G. W. and McCubbins, M. D. (1986). Electoral politics as a redistributive game. *The Journal of Politics*, 48(2):370–389
- Dixit, A. and Londregan, J. (1996). The determinants of success of special interests in redistributive politics. *The Journal of Politics*, 58(4):1132–1155
- Stokes, S. (2005). Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. *American Political Science Review*, 99(03):315–325
- Cox, G. W. (2010). Swing voters, core voters and distributive politics. In Shapiro, I., Stokes, S. C., Wood, E. J., and Krshner, A. S., editors, *Political Representation*, pages 342–357. Cambridge University Press
- Calvo, E. and Murillo, M. V. (2004). Who delivers? partisan clients in the argentine electoral market. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(4):742–757
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