

Seminar in Comparative Elections

POLS 6322

Tuesday

5:30-8:30 p.m.

[Zoom link](#)

University of Houston

Spring 2021

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Office Hours: Friday 2-4 P.M.

This is a graduate-level seminar examining the interaction between voters and political agents across different types of political institutions and contextual factors. Students will read and discuss both classic readings and recent studies on a non-exhaustive list of topics. The scope of these readings will cover analytical and empirical models, which requires familiarity with statistics (OLS) and research design. The goals for this course are three: (1) to understand the basic theoretical questions and arguments in the study of elections, (2) to explore and evaluate different empirical tests for the theoretical expectations, and (3) to create a space for students to come with a solid research idea for their professional career.

The course is divided into four sections. The first part reviews the basic theories of electoral accountability and representation. The second part of the course is a survey of electoral institutions and will focus on the different consequences of the electoral rules. The third part of the course examines several approaches to voting behavior. The final part of the course covers a subset of issues regarding elections in developing democracies.

Requirements

Participation (25%): Each student is expected to attend each class, do the reading thoroughly and in advance, and contribute actively to our discussion. You should be prepared to be called on to describe and discuss each of the assigned readings. Email me ahead of time if you need an excused absence.

Referee Reports (3×10%=30%): Students should pick three sessions to write a 2-3 pages referee report, which will focus on either of the last two articles listed as the assigned material for that week. These reports need to focus on any shortcomings of the reading, as well as propose realistic and constructive ways to improve the article. Each report should summarize the main argument of the reading in the first paragraph. The rest of the report must thoroughly explain the main problems in logic or evidence of the reading.¹

Students can only submit one paper per session and cannot submit reports in consecutive weeks.

Final Paper (45%): As a final assignment for the course, you will submit a 15-20 page research proposal. Your paper will propose an original idea on one of the topics related to the study of the elections. The goal of this assignment is to provide you an opportunity to work on a project that can serve you as a dissertation chapter or a further publication. The proposal should contain a brief survey of the literature of the theme and then describe a theoretical argument and a research design to test it. We will devote time throughout the semester to talk about the different steps involved in developing a research paper. Observe that you do not need to show any empirical results but rather focus on delivering an original idea and a clean and feasible research design that you can work on your own after the end of the course.

The assignment will have the following milestones. You should have an approved research topic by February 9. There will be a 5-minute presentation of your research question and preliminary research design on March 12. You will submit a preliminary draft of your manuscript to reviewed

¹For more information on how to write a peer-review, please check Miller, B., et. al. "How To Be a Peer Reviewer: A Guide for Recent and Soon-to-be PhDs " *PS: Political Science & Politics* 46(1), 120-123.

by any of your peers on April 16. You will also provide feedback to a paper of any of your peers by April 22. The final version of the manuscript is due on May 12 at noon.

Course Policies

Netiquette in the Age of COVID: To make sure we can have a productive time during the seminar, I ask you to avoid checking your email or using the web for anything else than the material for the class. Also, please refrain from using private chatting. Access to a webcam is required for students participating remotely in this course. Webcams must be turned on during the entire class.

Email communications related to this course will be sent to your Exchange email account which each University of Houston student receives.² The Exchange mail server can be accessed via Outlook, which provides a single location for organizing and managing day-to-day information, from email and calendars to contacts and task lists. Exchange email accounts can be accessed by logging into Office 365 with your CougarNet credentials or through Access UH. Additional assistance can be found at the Get Help page (<https://uh.edu/infotech/help/>).

Deadlines and Extensions: Assignments submitted after the deadline will get a 10% penalty and another 10% for every additional 24-hour delay.

Disabilities: The University of Houston System complies with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, pertaining to the provision of reasonable academic adjustments and auxiliary aids for students with a disability. In accordance with Section 504 and ADA guidelines, the University of Houston strives to provide reasonable academic adjustments/auxiliary aids to students who request and require them.

If you have a disability that requires special testing accommodations or other classroom modifications, you need to notify both me after you contacted the Center for Students with DisAbilities (CSD).³

Counseling and Psychological Services: Counseling and Psychological Services (CAPS) can help students who are having difficulties managing stress, adjusting to college, or feeling sad and hopeless. You can reach CAPS (www.uh.edu/caps) by calling 713-743-5454 during and after business hours for routine appointments or if you or someone you know is in crisis. No appointment is necessary for the “Let’s Talk” program, a drop-in consultation service at convenient locations and hours around campus.⁴

Academic Integrity: There is a zero tolerance policy for plagiarism in any of the required activities for this course, and any violation will be penalized in the terms cited by the UH’s Academic Dishonesty Policy.⁵

Excused Absence Policy: Regular class attendance, participation, and engagement in coursework are important contributors to student success. Absences may be excused as provided in the University of Houston Graduate Excused Absence Policy for reasons including: medical illness of student or close relative, death of a close family member, legal or government proceeding that a student is obligated to attend, recognized professional and educational activities where the student is presenting, and University-sponsored activity or athletic competition.⁶ Under these policies, students with excused absences will be provided with an opportunity to make up any quiz, exam or other work that contributes to the course grade or a satisfactory alternative. Please read the full policy

²<https://uh.edu/infotech/services/accounts/email/>

³<http://www.uh.edu/csd/>

⁴http://www.uh.edu/caps/outreach/lets_talk.html

⁵<http://www.uh.edu/academics/catalog/policies/academ-reg/academic-honesty/>

⁶<https://uh.edu/provost/policies-resources/student/excused-absence-policy/index.php>

for details regarding reasons for excused absences, the approval process, and extended absences. Additional policies address absences related to military service, religious holy days, pregnancy and related conditions, and disability.

Syllabus Changes: Due to the changing nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, please note that the instructor may need to make modifications to the course syllabus and may do so at any time. Notice of such changes will be announced as quickly as possible through (specify how students will be notified of changes).

Course Materials

All the published articles are available through JSTOR, and other material will be available via Blackboard. We will read most of the books listed below, so I suggest that you purchase them.

Przeworski, A. (2018). *Why Bother with Elections?* Polity.

Shugart, M. S. and Taagepera, R. (2017). *Votes from Seats*. Cambridge University Press.

I also encourage you to purchase the following book as a companion for the readings assigned in the course:

Angrist, J. D. and Pischke, J.-S. (2014). *Mastering 'Metrics: The Path from Cause to Effect*. Princeton University Press.

Items under *Read* are required for the seminar. These readings combine seminal readings on the topic with recent publications and working papers. *Recommended* readings include articles referred to in class and other recent articles that will give you a better understanding of the main debates on the topic. *Background* readings contain some seminal and related pieces on the topic that will help you expand your knowledge on the topic.

I. Introduction

January 19. Seminar Motivation and Logistics

Read:

Przeworski, A. (2018). *Why Bother with Elections?* Polity. Chapters 1-5.

Shepsle, K. A. (2010). *Analyzing Politics*. W.W. Norton & Co. Chapter 4.

Riker, W. H. (1982a). *Liberalism Against Populism*. Waveland Press. Chapter 1.

Borges, J. L. (1944[1956]). Funes the memorious. In *Ficciones*. Grove Weidenfeld, New York

January 26. Electoral Accountability and Representation

Read:

Przeworski, A. (2018). *Why Bother with Elections?* Polity. Chapters 6-9, 12.

Przeworski, A., Stokes, S., and Manin, B. (1999). Introduction. In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge University Press, New York. Introduction and Chapters 1.

Dal Bó, E., Finan, F., Folke, O., Persson, T., and Rickne, J. (2017). Who becomes a politician? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 132(4):1877–1914

Sheffer, L., Lowen, P. J., Soroka, S., Walgrave, S., and Sheafer, T. (2018). Nonrepresentative representatives: An experimental study of the decision making of elected politicians. *American Journal of Political Science*, 112(2):302–321

Recommended:

- Pitkin, H. F. (1967). *The Concept of Representation*. University of California Press, Berkeley
- Klašnja, M. and Titiunik, R. (2017). The incumbency curse: Weak parties, term limits, and unfulfilled accountability. *American Political Science Review*, 111(1):129–148
- Motolinia, L. (Forthcoming). Electoral accountability and particularistic legislation: Evidence from an electoral reform in Mexico. *American Political Science Review*
- Fearon, J. (1999). Electoral accountability and the control of politicians. In Przeworski, A., Manin, B., and Stokes, S., editors, *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge University Press
- Ferejohn, J. (1986). Incumbent performance and electoral control. *Public Choice*, 50(1-3):5–25
- Besley, T. (2006). *Principled Agents?* Cambridge University Press
- Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1997). Separation of powers and political accountability. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(4):1163–1202
- Adserà, A., Boix, C., and Payne, M. (2003). Are you being served? Political accountability and quality of government. *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 19(2):445–490
- Mattozzi, A. and Merlo, A. (2008). Political careers or career politicians? *Journal of Public Economics*, 93(3-4):597–608

Background:

- Besley, T. and Coate, S. (1997). An economic model of representative democracy. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(1):85–114
- Besley, T. (2006). *Principled Agents?* Cambridge University Press
- Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1997). Separation of powers and political accountability. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(4):1163–1202
- Lee, D. S., Moretti, E., and Butler, M. J. (2004). Do voters affect or elect policies? Evidence from the U. S. House. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(3):807–859
- Miller, G. (2008). Women’s suffrage, political responsiveness, and child survival in American history. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(3):1287–1327
- Key, V. (1966). *The Responsible Electorate*. Vintage Books
- Strøm, K. (2000). Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies. *European Journal of Political Research*, 37(3):261–290
- Chattopadhyay, R. and Duflo, E. (2004). Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in India. *Econometrica*, 72(5):1409–1443
- Huber, J. D. and Powell, B. G. (1994). Congruence between citizens and policymakers in two visions of liberal democracy. *World Politics*, 46(3):291–326
- Mayhew, D. R. (1974). Congressional elections: The case of the vanishing marginals. *Polity*, (6):295–317

- Key, V. (1966). *The Responsible Electorate*. Vintage Books
- Manin, B. (1997). *The Principle of Representative Government*. Cambridge University Press
- Barro, R. (1973). The control of politicians: An economic model. *Public Choice*, 14(1):19–42
- Iversen, T. and Rosenbluth, F. (2008). Work and power: The connection between female labor force participation and female political representation. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11:479–95
- Banks, J. S. and Sundaram, R. (1993). Adverse selection and moral hazard in a repeated elections model. In Barnett, W., Hinich, M. J., and Schiefeld, N., editors, *Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Samuels, D. J. and Shugart, M. S. (2003). Presidentialism, elections and representation. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 15(1):33–60
- Drazen, A. (2000). *Political Economy in Macroeconomics*. Princeton University Press. Chapter 7
- Gottlieb, J. (2015). Greater expectations: A field experiment to improve accountability in Mali. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(1):143–157
- Harrington Jr., J. E. (1993). The impact of reelection pressures on the fulfillment of campaign promises. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 5(1):71–97
- Bo, E. D. and Rossi, M. (2011). Term length and the effort of politicians. *Review of Economic Studies*, 78(4):1237–1263
- Lee, D. S., Moretti, E., and Butler, M. J. (2004). Do voters affect or elect policies? Evidence from the U. S. House. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(3):807–859

February 2. Measurement

Read:

- Laakso, M. and Taagepera, R. (1979). Effective number of parties: A measure with application to West Europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 12(1):3–27
- Gallagher, M. (1991). Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems. *Electoral Studies*, 10(1):33–51
- Cox, G. W., Fiva, J. H., and Smith, D. M. (2020). Measuring the competitiveness of elections. *Political Analysis*, 28:168–185
- Castanho Silva, B. and Littvay, L. (2019). Comparative research is harder than we thought: Regional differences in experts’ understanding of electoral integrity questions. *Political Analysis*, 27:599–604

Recommended:

- Trochim, W. and Donnelly, J. P. (2006). *The Research Methods Knowledge Base*. Atomic Dog, Cincinnati, Chapter 5.
- Taagepera, R. (2007b). *Predicting Party Sizes*. Oxford University Press
- Grofman, B. and Selb, P. (2009). A fully general index of political competition. *Electoral Studies*, 28(2):291–6
- Blais, A. and Lago, I. (2009). A general measure of district competitiveness. *Electoral Studies*, 28:94–100

Background:

- Folke, O. (2014). Shades of brown and green: Party effects in proportional election systems. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 12(5):1361–1395
- Gallagher, M. (1992). Comparing proportional representation electoral systems: Quotas, thresholds, paradoxes and majorities. *British Journal of Political Science*, 22(4):469–496
- Ruiz-Rufino, R. (2007). Aggregated threshold functions or how to measure the performance of an electoral system. *Electoral Studies*, 26:492–502
- Cronert, A. and Nyman, P. (Forthcoming). A general approach to measuring electoral competitiveness for parties and governments. *Political Analysis*
- Alvarez, R. M. and Nagler, J. (1998). When politics and models collide: Estimating models of multiparty elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 42(1):55–96
- van der Eijk, C., van der Brug, W., Kroh, M., and Franklin, M. (2006). Rethinking the dependent variable in voting behavior: On the measurement and analysis of electoral utilities. *Electoral Studies*, 25(3):424–447
- Saiegh, S. (2015). Using joint scaling methods to study ideology and representation: Evidence from Latin America. *Political Analysis*, 23:363–384
- Tomz, M., Tucker, J. A., and Wittenberg, J. (2002). An easy and accurate regression model for multiparty electoral data. *Political Analysis*, 10(1):66–83
- Lewis, J. B. (2004). Extending king’s ecological inference model to multiple elections using markov chain monte carlo. In King, G., Rosen, O., and Tanner, M., editors, *Ecological Inference: New Methodological Strategies*, pages 97–122. Cambridge University Press
- Gabel, M. J. and Huber, J. D. (2000). Putting parties in their place: Inferring party left-right ideological positions from party manifestos data. *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(1):94–103
- Clinton, J., Jackman, S., and Rivers, D. (2004). The statistical analysis of roll call data. *The American Political Science Review*, 98(2):355–370
- Grimmer, J. and Stewart, B. (2013). Text ad data: The promise and pitfalls of automatic content analysis methods for political texts. *Political Analysis*, 21(3):267–297
- Proksch, S. and Slapin, J. (2010). Position taking in european parliament speeches. *British Journal of Political Science*, 40(3):587–611
- Kayser, M. A. and Lindstädt, R. (2015). A cross-national measure of electoral competitiveness. *Political Analysis*, 23(2):242–253
- Abou-Chadi, T. and Orłowski, M. (2016). Moderate as necessary: The role of electoral competitiveness and party size in explaining parties’ policy shifts. *Journal of Politics*, 78(3):868–881
- Kotakorpi, K., Poutvaara, P., and Terviö, M. (2017). Returns to office in national and local politics: A bootstrap method and evidence from Finland. *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 33(3):413–442

II. Electoral Institutions

February 9. Introduction

Read:

- Shugart, M. S. and Taagepera, R. (2017). *Votes from Seats*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-6.
- Carey, J. M. and Hix, S. (2011). The electoral sweet spot: Low-magnitude proportional electoral systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2):382–397
- Kam, C., Bertelli, A. M., and Held, A. (2020). The electoral system, the party system and accountability in parliamentary government. *American Political Science Review*, 114(3):744–760
- Becher, M. and Menéndez González, I. (2019). Electoral reform and trade-offs in representation. *American Political Science Review*, 113(3):694–709

Recommended:

- Calvo, E. and Rodden, J. A. (2015). The Achilles heel of plurality systems: Geography and representation in multiparty democracies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(4):789–805
- Cox, G. W. (2005). Electoral institutions and party competitions. In Menard, C. and Shirley, M. M., editors, *Handbook of New Institutional Economics*. Springer
- Carey, J. M. and Hix, S. (2011). The electoral sweet spot: Low-magnitude proportional electoral systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2):382–397
- Taagepera, R. (2007a). Electoral systems. In Boix, C. and Stokes, S., editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford University Press
- Kedar, O., Harsgor, L., and Sheinerman, R. A. (2016). Are voters equal under proportional representation? *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(3):676–691
- Dinas, E., Riera, P., and Roussias, N. (2015). Staying in the first league: Parliamentary representation and the electoral success of small parties. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 3(2):187–204

Background:

- Reynolds, A., Reilly, B., and Ellis, A. (2005). *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm
- Norris, P. (2004). *Electoral Engineering*. Cambridge University Press
- Lakeman, E. and Lambert, J. (1955). *Voting in Democracies: A Study of Majority and Proportional Electoral Systems*. Faber and Faber, London
- Lijphart, A. (1994). *Electoral systems and party systems: A study of twenty-seven democracies*. Oxford University Press, Oxford
- Taagepera, R. and Shugart, M. S. (1989). *Seats and Votes*. Yale University Press, New Haven

- Bowler, S. and Grofman, B. (2000). *Elections in Australia, Ireland, and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote: Reflections on an Embedded Institution*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor
- Farrell, D. M. (2001). *Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction*. Palgrave, Houndmills
- Katz, R. S. (1997). *Democracy and Elections*. Oxford University Press, New York
- Grofman, B., S-C., L., Winckler, E., and Woodall, B., editors (1999). *Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor
- Reynolds, A. (1999). *Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa*. Oxford University Press, Oxford
- Snyder, R. and Samuels, D. J. (2004). Legislative malapportionment in Latin America: Historical and comparative perspectives. In Gibson, E. L., editor, *Federalism and Democracy in Latin America*. John Hopkins University Press
- Jones, M. (1995). A guide to the electoral systems of the Americas. *Electoral Studies*, 14(1):5–21

February 16. The Direct Consequences of Electoral Rules

Read:

- Cox, G. W. (1997). *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2, 4-5.
- Shugart, M. S. and Taagepera, R. (2017). *Votes from Seats*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 7-10.
- Pons, V. and Tricaud, C. (2018). Expressive voting and its costs: Evidence from runoffs with two or three candidates. *Econometrica*, 86(5):1621–1649
- Lucardi, A. (2019). The effect of district magnitude on electoral outcomes. Evidence from two natural experiments in Argentina. *British Journal of Political Science*, 49(2):557–577

Recommended:

- Duverger, M. (1954). *Political Parties*. Wiley, New York. Book II, Chapter 1
- Chhibber, P. and Kollman, K. (1998). Party aggregation and the number of parties in India and the United States. *The American Political Science Review*, 92(2):329–342
- Clark, W. R. and Golder, M. (2006). Rehabilitating Duverger's law: Testing the mechanical and strategic modifying effects of electoral laws. *Comparative Political Studies*, 39:679–708
- Potter, J. D. (2018). Constituency diversity, district magnitude and voter co-ordination. *British Journal of Political Science*, 48(1):91–113
- Blais, A., Lachat, R., Hino, A., and Doray-Demers, P. (2011). The mechanical and psychological effects of electoral systems: A quasi-experimental study. *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(12):1599–1621

- Artabe, A. and Gardeazabal, J. (2014). Strategic votes and sincere counterfactuals. *Political Analysis*, 22(2):243–257
- Meirowitz, A. (2005). Polling games and informations transmission. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 51:464–89
- Cox, G. W. and Shugart, M. S. (1996). Strategic voting under proportional representation. *Journal of Law Economics and Organization*, 12(2):299–324

Background:

- Riker, W. H. (1982b). The two-party system and Duverger’s law: An essay on the history of political science. *American Political Science Review*, 76(4):753–766
- Crisp, B. F., Olivella, S., and Potter, J. D. (2012). Electoral contexts that impede voter coordination. *Electoral Studies*, (31):143–158
- Blais, A., Lachat, R., Hino, A., and Doray-Demers, P. (2011). The mechanical and psychological effects of electoral systems: A quasi-experimental study. *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(12):1599–1621
- Alvarez, R. M., Boehmke, F. J., and Nagler, J. (2006). Strategic voting in British elections. *Electoral Studies*, 25(1):1–19
- Cox, G. W. and Shugart, M. S. (1996). Strategic voting under proportional representation. *Journal of Law Economics and Organization*, 12(2):299–324
- Moser, R. G. and Scheiner, E. (2012). *Electoral Systems and Political Context: How the Effects of Rules Vary Across New and Established Democracies*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Palfrey, T. and Rosenthal, H. (1985). Voter participation and strategic uncertainty. *American Political Science Review*, 79:62–78
- Blais, A., Nadeau, R., Gidengil, E., and Nevitte, N. (2001). Measuring strategic voting in multiparty plurality elections. *Electoral Studies*, pages 343–352
- Alvarez, R. M. and Nagler, J. (2000). A new approach for modelling strategic voting in multiparty elections. *British Journal of Political Science*, 30(1):pp. 57–75
- Gibbard, A. (1973). Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. *Econometrica*, 41:587–601
- Meirowitz, A. and Tucker, J. A. (2007). Run boris run: Strategic voting in sequential elections. *The Journal of Politics*, 69(1):88–99
- Piketty, T. (2000). Voting as communicating. *Review of Economic Studies*, 67(1):169–91
- Spenkuch, J. L. (2014). Please don’t vote for me: Voting in a natural experiment with perverse incentives. *The Economic Journal*, 125:1025–1052
- Li, Y. and Shugart, M. S. (2016). The seat product model of the effective number of parties: A case for applied political science. *Electoral Studies*, 41:23–34

February 23. The Indirect Consequences of Electoral Rules

Read:

- Katz, R. S. (1986). Intrapreference party voting. In Grofman, B. and Lijphart, A., editors, *Electoral laws and their political consequences*, pages 85–103. Agathon Press, New York
- Shugart, M. S. and Taagepera, R. (2017). *Votes from Seats*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 13-14.
- Sudulich, L. and Trumm, S. (2019). A comparative study of the effects of electoral institutions on campaigns. *British Journal of Political Science*, 49(1):381–399
- Jurado, I. and León, S. (2019). Geography matters: The conditional effect of electoral systems on social spending. *British Journal of Political Science*, 49(1):81–103

Recommended:

- Blumenau, J., Eggers, A. C., Hangartner, D., and Hix, S. (2017). Open/closed list and party choice: Experimental evidence from the U.K. *British Journal of Political Science*, 47(4):809–827
- Catalinac, A. (2018). Positioning under alternative electoral systems: Evidence from Japanese candidate election manifestos. *American Political Science Review*, 112(1):31–48
- Carey, J. M. (2007). Competing principals, political institutions, and party unity in legislative voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1):92–107
- Iversen, T. and Soskice, D. (2006). Electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions: Why some democracies redistribute more than others. *American Political Science Review*, 100(2):165–82
- Beath, A., Christia, F., Egorov, G., and Enikolopov, R. (2016). Electoral rules and political selection: Theory and evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan. *Review of Economic Studies*, 83:932–968
- Desposato, S. W. (2006). The impact of electoral rules on legislative parties: Lessons from the Brazilian senate and chamber of deputies. *Journal of Politics*, 68(4):1018–1030
- Moser, R. G. and Scheiner, E. (2012). *Electoral Systems and Political Context: How the Effects of Rules Vary Across New and Established Democracies*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Chapters 1 and 8
- Calvo, E. and Hellwig, T. (2011). Centripetal and centrifugal incentives under different electoral systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(1):27–41
- Rickard, S. J. (2012). Electoral systems, voters' interests and geographic dispersion. *British Journal of Political Science*, 42(4):855–877

Background:

- Rae, D. (1971). *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. Yale University Press, New Haven
- Cox, G. W. (1990). Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 34(4):903–936

- Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2003). *The Economic Effect of Constitutions*. MIT Press
- Powell, B. G. (2009). The ideological congruence controversy. *Comparative Political Studies*, 42:1475–1497
- Katz, R. S. (1986). Intrapreference party voting. In Grofman, B. and Lijphart, A., editors, *Electoral laws and their political consequences*, pages 85–103. Agathon Press, New York
- Grofman, B. and Lijphart, A., editors (1984). *Electoral laws and their political consequences*. Agathon Press, New York
- Amorim Neto, O. and Cox, G. W. (1997). Electoral insitutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 41(1):149–174
- Cox, G. W. (1988). Electoral rules and the calculus of mobilization
- Manow, P. (2009). Electoral rules, class coalitions and welfare state regimes, or how to explain esping-andersen with stein rokkan. *Socio-Economic Review*, 1(101-121)
- Naoi, M. and Krauss, E. (2008). Who lobbies whom? Electoral systems and organized interests' choice of bureaucrats vs. politicians in Japan
- Ames, B. (1995). Electoral strategy under open-list proportional representation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 39(2):406–433
- Austen-Smith, D. and Banks, J. S. (1988). Elections, coalitions, and legislative outcomes. *The American Political Science Review*, 82(2)
- Samuels, D. J. (1999). Incentives to cultivate a party vote in candidate-centric systems: evidence from Brazil. *Comparative Political Studies*, 32:487–518
- Ardanaz, M. and Scartascini, C. (2013). Inequality and Personal Income Taxation: The Origins and Effects of Legislative Malapportionment. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(12):1638–1663
- Edwards, M. S. and Thames, F. C. (2007). District magnitude, personal votes, and government expenditures. *Electoral Studies*, 26(2):338 – 345
- Rogowski, R. and Kayser, M. A. (2002). Majoritarian electoral systems and consumer power: Price-level evidence from the OECD countries. *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(3):526–539
- Morgenstern, S. and Vázquez-D'Elía, J. (2007). Electoral laws, parties, and party systems in Latin America. *Annual Review of Political Science*, (10):143–68
- Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2007). Electoral systems and economic policy. In Weingast, B. W. and Wittman, D. A., editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Oxford University Press
- Myerson, R. B. (1993). Incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems. *The American Political Science Review*, 87(4):856–869
- Osborne, M. J. and Slivinski, A. (1996). A model of political competition with citizen-candidates. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 111(1):65–96

III. Voting Behavior

March 2. Spatial Voting

Assumed:

Downs, A. (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Harper & Row Publishers

Read:

Adams, J. F., Merrill III, S., and Grofman, B. (2005). *A Unified Theory of Party Competition: A Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors*. Cambridge University Press, New York, Chapters 1-3

Kedar, O. (2005). When moderate voters prefer extreme parties: Policy balancing in parliamentary elections. *American Political Science Review*, 99(2):185–199

Johns, R. and Kölln, A.-K. (2020). Moderation and competence: How a party's ideological position shapes its valence reputation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 64:649–663

Muraoka, T. and Rosas, G. (Forthcoming). Does economic inequality drive voters' disagreement about party placement? *American Journal of Political Science*

Recommended:

Iversen, T. (1994b). Political leadership and representation in West European democracies: A test of three models of voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 38(1):45–74

Lachat, R. (2015). The role of party identification in spatial models of voting choice. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 3(3):641–658

Franchino, F. and Zucchini, F. (2015). Voting in a multi-dimensional space: A conjoint analysis employing valence and ideology attributes of candidates. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 3(2):221–241

Calvo, E. and Murillo, M. V. (2019). *Non-Policy Politics*. Cambridge University Press, New York

Background:

Queralt, D. (2012). Spatial voting in Spain. *South European Society and Politics*, 17(3):375–392

Westholm, A. (1997). Distance vs. direction: the illusory defeat of the proximity theory of electoral choice. *American Journal of Political Science*, 91(4):865–885

Lewis, J. B. (2001). Estimating voter preference distributions from individual-level voting data. *Political Analysis*, 9(3):275–297

Lewis, J. B. and King, G. (1999). No evidence on directional vs. proximity voting. *Political Analysis*, 8(1):21–33

Tomz, M. and Houweling, R. P. V. (2008). Candidate positioning and voter choice. *American Political Science Review*, 102(3):303–318

- Alesina, A. (1988). Credibility and policy convergence in a two-party system with rational voters. *The American Economic Review*, 78(4):796–805
- Adams, J. F., Merrill, S., and Grofman, B. (1999). *A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Rivers, D. (1988). Heterogeneity in models of electoral choice. *American Journal of Political Science*, 32(737-57)
- Iversen, T. (1994a). The logics of electoral politics: Spatial, directional, and mobilizational effects. *Comparative Political Studies*, 27(21):55–189
- Rabinowitz, G. and Macdonald, S. E. (1989). A directional theory of issue voting. *American Political Science Review*, 83(1):93–121

March 9. Economic Voting

Read:

- Lewis-Beck, M. S., Nadeau, R., and Elias, A. (2008). Economics, party, and the vote: Causality issues and panel data. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(1):84–95
- Bisgaard, M. (2015). Bias will find a way: Economic perceptions, attributions of blame, and partisan-motivated reasoning during crisis. *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 77(3):849–860
- Funke, M., Schularick, M., and Trebesch, C. (2016). Going to extremes: Politics after financial crises, 1870–2014. *European Economic Review*, 88:227–260
- Grewal, S., Jamal, A. A., Masoud, T., and Nugent, E. R. (2019). Poverty and divine rewards: The electoral advantage of islamist political parties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 63:859–874

Recommended:

- Powell, G. B. and Whitten, G. D. (1993). A cross-national analysis of economic voting: Taking account of the political context. *American Journal of Political Science*, 37(2):391–414
- Manacorda, M., Miguel, E., and Vigorito, A. (2011). Government transfers and political support. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, (3):1–28
- Alt, J. E., Lassen, D. D., and Marshall, J. (2015). Credible sources and sophisticated voters: When does new information induce economic voting? *Journal of Politics*, 78(2):327–342
- Tucker, J. (2006). *Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, 1990-1999*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-2
- Duch, R. M. and Stevenson, R. M. (2008). *The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Duch, R. M. and Stevenson, R. T. (2010). The global economy, competency, and the economic vote. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(1):195–123
- Kayser, M. A. and Wlezien, C. (50). Performance pressure: Patterns of partisanship and the economic vote. *European Journal of Political Research*, 3(365-94)

- Anderson, C. J. (2000). Economic voting and political context: A comparative perspective. *Electoral Studies*, 19(2-3):183–97
- Stokes, S. (2001). Public opinion of market reforms: A framework. In Stokes, S., editor, *Public Support for market reforms in new democracies*. Cambridge University Press
- Kayser, M. A. and Peress, M. (2012). Benchmarking across borders: Electoral accountability and the necessity of comparison. *American Political Science Review*, 106(3):661–684

Background:

- Tufte, E. R. (1975). Determinants of the outcomes of midterm congressional elections. *American Political Science Review*, 69(3):812–26
- Fiorina, M. (1981). *Retrospective Voting in American Elections*. Yale University Press
- MacKuen, Michael B., R. S. E. (1992). Peasants or bankers? The American electorate and the U.S. economy. *American Political Science Review*, 86(3):597–611
- Michael Bratton, R. M. and Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2005). *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa*. Cambridge University Press
- Samuels, D. (2004). Presidentialism and accountability for the economy in comparative perspective. *American Political Science Review*, 98(3):425–436
- Cheibub, J. A. (2006). Presidentialism, electoral identifiability, and budget balances in democratic systems. *American Political Science Review*, 100(3)
- Benton, A. (2005). Dissatisfied Democrats or Retrospective Voters?: Economic Hardship, Political Institutions, and Voting Behavior in Latin America. *Comparative Political Studies*, 38(4):417–442
- Posner, D. and Simon, D. J. (2002). Economic conditions and incumbent support in africa's new democracies: Evidence from Zambia. *Comparative Political Studies*, 35(3)
- Lewis-Beck, M. and Nadeau, R. (2000). French electoral institutions and the economic vote. *Electoral Studies*, 19(2-3):171–182
- Lewis-Beck, M. S. and Stegmaier, M. (2000). Economic determinants of electoral outcomes. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3:183–219
- Whitten, G. and Palmer, H. (1999). Cross national analyses of economic voting. *Electoral Studies*, 18:49–67

March 23. Identity Voting

Read:

- Przeworski, A. and Sprague, J. (1986). *Paper Stones*. The University of Chicago Press. Chapters 1-3.
- Chandra, K. (2004). *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2-4
- Houle, C., Kenny, P. D., and Park, C. (2018). The structure of ethnic inequality and ethnic voting. *Journal of Politics*, 81(1):187–200
- Piketty, T. (2020). *Capital and Ideology*. Harvard University Press. Chapter 14

Recommended:

- Huber, J. D. and Suryanarayan, P. (2016). Ethnic inequality and the ethnification of political parties: Evidence from India. *World Politics*, 68(1):148–188
- Klar, S. (2019). When common identities decrease trust: An experimental study of partisan women. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62:610–622
- Greene, S. (1999). Understanding party identification: A social identity approach. *Political Psychology*, 20(2):393–403
- Reilly, B. (2001). *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management*. Cambridge University Press
- Michelitch, K. (2015). Does electoral competition exacerbate interethnic or interpartisan economic discrimination? *American Political Science Review*, 109(1):43–61
- Ben-Bassat, A. and Dahan, M. (2012). Social identity and voting behavior. *Public Choice*, 151:193–214
- Ansolahehere, S. and Puy, M. S. (2019). Identity voting. *Public Choice*, 169:77–95
- Holli, A. M. and Wass, H. (2010). Gender-based voting in the parliamentary elections of 2007 in Finland. *European Journal of Political Research*, 49(5):598–630

Background:

- Geertz, C. (1973). *The Interpretations of Culture*. Basic Books
- Horowitz, D. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. University of California Press, Berkeley
- Horowitz, D. L. (2002). Constitutional design: proposals versus processes. *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*, pages 15–36
- Wilkinson, S. I. (2004). *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Abrajano, M. A. and Alvarez, R. M. (2005). A natural experiment of race-based and issue voting: The 2001 City of Los Angeles elections. *Political Research Quarterly*, 58(2):203–218
- Chauchard, S. (2014). Can descriptive representation change beliefs about a stigmatized group? Evidence from rural India. *American Political Science Review*, 108(2):403–422
- Ferree, K. (2006). Explaining South Africa’s racial census. *Journal of Politics*, 68(4):803–815
- Conroy-Krutz, J. (2013). Information and ethnic politics in Africa. *British Journal of Political Science*, 43(2):345–373
- Eifert, B., Miguel, T., and Posner, D. (2010). Political competition and ethnic identification in Africa. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(2):494–510
- Dunning, T. and Harrison, L. (2010). Cross-cutting cleavages and ethnic voting: An experimental study of cousinage in Mali. *American Political Science Review*, 104(1):1–19
- Casey, K. (2015). Crossing party lines: The effects of information on redistributive politics. *American Economic Review*, 105(6):2410–2448
- Adida, C., Gottlieb, J., Kramon, E., and McClendon, G. (2017). Reducing or reinforcing in-group preferences? an experiment on information and ethnic voting. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 12:437–477

March 30. Information

Read:

- Pande, R. (2011). Can informed voters enforce better governance? Experiments in low-income democracies. *Annual Review of Economics*, 3:215–37
- Lau, R. R., Patel, P., Fahmy, D. F., and Kaufman, R. R. (2014). Correct voting across thirty-three democracies: A preliminary analysis. *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(2):239–259
- Dunning, T., Grossman, G., Humphreys, M., Hyde, S. D., McIntosh, C., Nellis, G., Adida, C. L., Arias, E., Bicalho, C., Boas, T. C., Buntaine, M. T., Chauchard, S., Chowdhury, A., Gottlieb, J., Hidalgo, F. D., Holmlund, M., Jablonski, R., Kramon, E., Larreguy, H., Lierl, M., Marshall, J., McClendon, G., Melo, M. A., Nielson, D. L., Pickering, P. M., Platas, M. R., Querubin, P., Raffler, P., and Sircar, N. (2019). Voter information campaigns and political accountability: Cumulative findings from a preregistered meta-analysis of coordinated trials. *Science Advances*, 5(7)
- Peisakhin, L. and Rozenas, A. (2018). Electoral effects of biased media: Russian television in Ukraine. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62:535–550

Recommended:

- Lupia, A. (2015). *Uninformed*. Oxford University Press
- Alvarez, R. M. (1997). *Information and Elections*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor
- Grossman, G. and Michelitch, K. (2018). Information dissemination, competitive pressure, and politician performance between elections." *American Political Science Review*, 112(2):280–301
- Ferraz, C. and Finan, F. (2008). Exposing corrupt politicians: The effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(2):703–745
- Enikopolov, R., Petriva, M., and Zhuravskaya, E. (2011). Media and political persuasion: Evidence from Russia. *American Economic Review*, 101(7):3253–85
- Conroy-Krutz, J. and Moehler, D. C. (2015). Moderation from bias: A field experiment on partisan media in a new democracy. *Journal of Politics*, 77(2):575–587
- DellaVigna, S. and Kaplan, E. (2007). The Fox News effect: Media bias and voting. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(3):1187–1234

Background:

- Lupia, A. and McCubbins, M. (1998). *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?* Cambridge University Press
- Lupia, A., Levine, A. S., Menning, J. O., and Sin, G. (2007). Were Bush tax cut supporters "simply ignorant?" A second look at conservatives and liberals in "Homer gets a tax cut". *Perspectives on Politics*, (4):773–784
- Besley, T. and Burgess, R. (2002). The political economy of government responsiveness: Theory and evidence from India. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4)

- Kendall, C., Nannicini, T., and Trebbi, F. (2016). How do voters respond to information? Evidence from a randomized campaign. *American Economic Review*, 105(1):322–353
- Adams, J., Ezrow, L., and Somer-Topcu, Z. (2014). Do voters respond to party manifestos or to a wider information environment? an analysis of mass-elite linkages on european integration. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(4):967–978
- Arceneaux, K. and Johnson, M. (2013). *Changing Minds or Changing Channels?* The University of Chicago Press
- Aalberg, T., Papathanassopoulos, S., Soroka, S., Curran, J., Hayashi, K., Iyengar, S., Jones, P. K., Mazzoleni, G., Rojas, H., Rowe, D., and Tiffen, R. (14). International tv news, foreign affairs interest and public knowledge. *Journalism Studies*, 3(387-406)
- Van Aelst, P., Strömbäck, J., Aalberg, T., Esser, F., de Vreese, C., Matthes, J., Hopmann, D., Salgado, S., Hubé, N., Stepieńska, A., Papathanassopoulos, S., Berganza, R., Legnante, G., Reinemann, C., Sheaffer, T., and Stanyer, J. (2017). Political communication in a high-choice media environment: a challenge for democracy? *Annals of the International Communication Association*, 41(1):3–27
- McDonald Ladd, J. and Lenz, G. S. (2009). Exploiting a rare communication shift to document the persuasive power of the news media. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2):394–410
- Snyder, J. M. and Strömberg, D. (2010). Press coverage and political accountability. *Journal of Political Economy*, 118(2):355–408
- Vavreck, L. (2007). The exaggerated effects of advertising on turnout: The dangers of self-reports. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 2(4):325–343
- Gerber, A. S., Karlan, D., and Bergan, D. (2009). Does the media matter? A field experiment measuring the effect of newspapers on voting behavior and political opinions. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 1(2):35–52
- Boas, T. C. and Hidalgo, F. D. (2011). Controlling the airwaves: Incumbency advantage and community radio in Brazil. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(4):869–885

April 5. Electoral Campaigns

Read:

- LePennec, C. (2020). Strategic campaign communication: Evidence from 30,000 candidate manifestos. Working Paper
- Brierley, S., Kramon, E., and Ofosu, G. K. (2020). The moderating effect of debates on political attitudes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 64:19–37
- Jäger, K. (2020). When do campaign effects persist for years? Evidence from a natural experiment. *American Journal of Political Science*, 64:836–851
- Somer-Topcu, Z., Tavits, M., and Baumann, M. (2020). Does party rhetoric affect voter perceptions of party positions? *Electoral Studies*, 65:102–153

Recommended:

- Bowler, S. and Farrell, D. M. (1992). *Electoral Strategies and Political Marketing*. St. Martin's Press. Chapters 1, 12.
- Stevenson, R. T. and Vavreck, L. (2000). Does campaign length matter? Testing for cross-national effects. *British Journal of Political Science*, 30(2):217–235
- Kalla, J. L. and Broockman, D. E. (2018). The minimal persuasive effects of campaign contact in general elections: Evidence from 49 field experiments. *American Political Science Review*, 112(1):148–166
- Jennings, W. and Wlezien, C. (2015). The timeline of elections: A comparative perspective. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(1):219–233
- Pons, V. (2018). Will a five-minute discussion change your mind? A countrywide experiment on voter choice in France. *American Economic Review*, 108(6):1322–1363
- Gelman, A. and King, G. (1993). Why are american presidential election campaign polls so variable when votes are so predictable? *British Journal of Political Science*, 23(4):409–451

Background:

- Marcus, G. E. and Mackuen, M. B. (1993). Anxiety, enthusiasm, and the vote: The emotional underpinnings of learning and involvement during presidential campaigns. *The American Political Science Review*, 87(3):672–685
- Langston, J. and Morgenstern, S. (2009). Campaigning in an electoral authoritarian regime: The case of Mexico. *Comparative Politics*, 41(2):165–181
- Corazzini, L., Kube, S., Maréchal, M. A., and Nicolò, A. (2013). Elections and deceptions: An experimental study on the behavioral effects of democracy. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(3):579–592
- Buttice, M. and Milazzo, C. (2011). Candidate positioning in Britain. *Electoral Studies*, 30(4):848–857
- Benoit, K. and Marsh, M. (2010). Incumbent and challenger campaign spending effects in proportional electoral systems. *Political Research Quarterly*, 63(1):159–173
- Crisp, B. F. and Desposato, S. W. (2004). Constituency building in multimember districts: Collusion or conflict? *Journal of Politics*, 66(1):136–156
- Snyder, J. M. (1989). Election goals and the allocation of campaign resources. *Econometrica*, 57(3):637–660
- Johnson, J. (48). Campaign spending in proportional electoral systems: Incumbents versus challengers revisited. *Comparative Political Studies*, 3(968-993)
- Greenberg, S. B. (2009). *Dispatches from the War Room*. St. Martin's Press, New York
- Ames, B. (1995). Electoral strategy under open-list proportional representation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 39(2):406–433
- Vavreck, L. (2009). *The Message Matters: The Economy and Presidential Campaigns*. Princeton University Press

- Steven E. F. (1993). Reexamining the "minimal effects" model in recent presidential campaigns. *The Journal of Politics*, 55(1):1–21
- Kahn, K. F. and Kenney, P. J. (1999). Do negative campaigns mobilize or suppress turnout? clarifying the relationship between negativity and participation. *American Political Science Review*, 93(4):877–889
- Huber, G. A. and Arceneaux, K. (2007). Identifying the persuasive effects of presidential advertising. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(4):957–977
- Silveira, B. S. D. and Mello, J. M. O. D. (2011). Campaign advertising and election outcomes: Quasi-natural experiment evidence from gubernatorial elections in Brazil. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 78(2):590–612
- Hersh, E. (2015). *Hacking the Electorate*. Cambridge University Press
- Boas, T. C. (2010). Varieties of electioneering: Success contagion and presidential campaigns in Latin America. *World Politics*, 62(4):636–675
- Walter, A. S., van der Brug, W., and van Praag, P. (2014). When the stakes are high: Party competition and negative campaigning. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(4):550–573

IV. Topics in Elections

April 12. Elections in Dictatorships

Read:

- Hermet, G. (1978). State-controlled elections: a framework. In Hermet, G., Rose, R., and Rouquié, A., editors, *Elections without choice*, pages 1–18. The Macmillan Press LTD, london edition
- Blaydes, L. A. (2011). *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. Cambridge University Press, New York. Chapters 1-3
- Gandhi, J. and Ong, E. (2019). Committed or conditional democrats? Opposition dynamics in electoral autocracies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 63:948–963
- Dinas, E. and Northmore-Ball, K. (2020). The ideological shadow of authoritarianism. *Comparative Political Studies*, 53(12):1957–1991

Recommended:

- Schedler, A. (2013). *The Politics of Uncertainty*. Oxford University Press, New York
- Magaloni, B. (2006). *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge University Press, New York
- Cox, G. W. (2009). Authoritarian elections and leadership succession, 1975-2000. Working Paper
- Gandhi, J. and Lust-Okar, E. (2009). Elections under authoritarianism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, (12):403–422
- Svolik, M. W. (2012). *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press

Background:

- Geddes, B. and Zaller, J. (1989). Sources of popular support for authoritarian regimes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 33(2):319–347
- Lust-Okar, E. (2005). *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World. Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions*. Cambridge University Press, New York
- Gandhi, J. (2014). The role of presidential power in authoritarian elections. In Ginsburg, T. and Simpser, A., editors, *Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes*. Cambridge University Press
- Malesky, E. J. and Schuler, P. (2011). The single-party dictator’s dilemma: Information in elections without opposition. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 36(4):491–530
- Posada-Carbó, E., editor (1996). *Elections before Democracy: The History of Elections in Europe and Latin America*. Macmillan Press LTD, London
- Levitsky, S. and Way, L. A. (2010). *Competitive Authoritarianism*. Cambridge University Press, New York
- Boix, C. and Svolik, M. W. (2013). The foundations of limited authoritarian government: Institutions, commitment, and power-sharing in dictatorships. *Journal of Politics*, 75(2):300–316
- Reuter, O. J. and Robertson, G. B. (2012). Subnational appointments in authoritarian regimes: Evidence from russian gubernatorial appointments. *The Journal of Politics*, 74(4):1023–1037
- Croke, K., Grossman, G., Larreguy, H., and Marshall, J. (2016). Deliberate disengagement: How education can decrease political participation in electoral authoritarian regimes. *American Political Science Review*, 110(3):579–600
- Hale, H. E. and Colton, T. J. (2017). Who defects? unpacking a defection cascade from russia’s dominant party 2008-12. *American Political Science Review*, 11(2):322–337

April 19. Clientelism and Vote Buying

Read:

- Stokes, S., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M., and Brusco, V. (2013). *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism*. Cambridge University Press, New York. Chapters 1 and 2.
- Díaz-Cayeros, A., Estévez, F., and Magaloni, B. (2016). *The Political Logic of Poverty Relief: Electoral Strategies and Social Policy in Mexico*. Cambridge University Press. Introduction and Chapter 3.
- Brierley, S. and Nathan, N. L. (Fortcoming). The connections of party brokers. *Journal of Politics*
- Gingerich, D. W. (2020). Buying power: Electoral strategy before the secret vote. *American Political Science Review*, 114(4):1086–1102

Recommended:

- Cox, G. W. and McCubbins, M. D. (1986). Electoral politics as a redistributive game. *The Journal of Politics*, 48(2):370–389
- Dixit, A. and Londregan, J. (1996). The determinants of success of special interests in redistributive politics. *The Journal of Politics*, 58(4):1132–1155
- Stokes, S. (2005). Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. *American Political Science Review*, 99(03):315–325
- Nichter, S. (2014). Conceptualizing vote buying. *Electoral Studies*, 35:315–327
- Cruz, C., Labonne, J., and Querubín, P. (2017). Politician family networks and electoral outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines. *American Economic Review*, 107(10):3006–3037
- Gonzalez-Ocantos, E., Kiewiet de Jonge, C., and Nickerson, D. W. (2014). The conditionality of vote-buying norms: Experimental evidence from Latin America. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(1):197–211

Background:

- Calvo, E. and Murillo, M. V. (2004). Who delivers? partisan clients in the argentine electoral market. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(4):742–757
- Calvo, E. and Murillo, M. V. (2013). When parties meet voters: Assessing political linkages through partisan networks and distributive expectations in argentina and chile. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(7):851–882
- Gonzalez-Ocantos, E., Kiewiet de Jonge, C., Melendez, C., Osorio, J., and Nickerson, D. W. (2012). Vote buying and social desirability bias: Experimental evidence from Nicaragua. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(1):202–217
- Gans-Morse, J., Mazzuca, S., and Nichter, S. (2014). Varieties of clientelism: Machine politics during elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(2):415–432
- Larreguy, H., Marshall, J., and Querubin, P. (2016). Parties, brokers and voter mobilization: How turnout buying depends upon the party’s capacity to monitor brokers. *American Political Science Review*, 10(1):160–179
- Nichter, S. (2008). Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret ballot. *American Political Science Review*, 102(1):19–31
- Albertus, M. (2013). Vote buying with multiple distributive goods. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(9):1082–1111
- Vicente, P. C. and Wantchekon, L. (2009). Clientelism and vote buying: lessons from field experiments in African elections. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 25(2):292–305
- Weitz-Shapiro, R. (2012). What wins votes: Why some politicians opt out of clientelism. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(3):568–583
- Finan, F. and Schechter, L. (2012). Vote-buying and reciprocity. *Econometrica*, 80(2):863–881

- Wantchekon, L. (2003). Clientelism and voting behavior: evidence from a field experiment in Benin. *World Politics*, (55):399–422
- Cox, G. W. (2010). Swing voters, core voters and distributive politics. In Shapiro, I., Stokes, S. C., Wood, E. J., and Krshner, A. S., editors, *Political Representation*, pages 342–357. Cambridge University Press
- Szwarcberg, M. (2013). The microfoundations of political clientelism: Lessons from the Argentine case. *Latin American Research Review*, 48(2):32–54
- Nichter, S. (2018). *Surviving Politics*. Cambridge University Press
- Mares, I. and Young, L. E. (Forthcoming). The core voter’s curse: Clientelistic threats and promises in Hungarian elections. *Comparative Political Studies*

April 26. Electoral Integrity

Read:

- Simpser, A. (2013). *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications*. Cambridge University Press, New York. Chapters 2-3.
- Callen, M. and Long, J. D. (2015). Institutional corruption and election fraud: Evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan. *American Economic Review*, 105(1):354–381
- Ofosu, G. K. (2019). Do fairer elections increase the responsiveness of politicians? *American Political Science Review*, 113(4):963–979
- Rueda, M. R. and Ruiz, N. A. (2020). Political agency, election quality, and corruption. *Journal of Politics*, 82(4):1256–1270

Recommended:

- Birch, S. (2012). *Electoral Malpractice*. Oxford University Press, New York
- Rundlett, A. and Svolik, M. W. (2016). Deliver the vote! micromotives and macrobehavior in electoral fraud. *American Political Science Review*, 10(1):180–197
- Mares, I. (2015). *From Open Secrets to Secret Voting: The Adoption of Electoral Reforms Protecting Voters Against Electoral Intimidation*. Cambridge University Press, New York

Background:

- Norris, P. (2014). *Why Electoral Integrity Matters*. Cambridge University Press
- Mebane, W. R. (2015). Election forensics toolkit. DRG Center Working Paper
- Alvarez, R. M., Hall, T. E., and Hyde, S. D., editors (2008). *Election Fraud*. The Brookings Institution
- Hausmann, R. and Rigobón, R. (2011). In search of the black swan: Analysis of the statistical evidence of electoral fraud in Venezuela. *Statistical Science*, 26(4):543–563
- Hyde, S. D. (2011). *The Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma: Why Election Observation Became an International Norm*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY

- Kelley, J. (2012). *Monitoring Democracy*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
- Myagkov, M., Ordeshook, P. C., and Shakin, D. (2009). *The foresins of election fraud: Russia and Ukraine*. Cambridge University Press, New York
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