

<b>Seminar in Comparative Elections</b>	University of Houston
<b>POLS 6322</b>	Spring 2023
Wednesday	Francisco Cantú
1-4:50 p.m.	<a href="mailto:fcantu10@uh.edu">fcantu10@uh.edu</a>
PGH 310	Office Hours: Monday 2-4 P.M.

This graduate-level seminar examines the interaction between voters and political agents across different political institutions and contextual factors. Students will read and discuss classic readings and recent studies on a non-exhaustive list of topics related to elections. The scope of these readings will cover analytical and empirical models, which require familiarity with statistics (OLS) and research design. The goals for this course are four: (1) to understand the basic theoretical questions and arguments in the study of elections, (2) to be familiar with important recent studies and cutting-edge research methods used in the study of elections, (3) to evaluate existing research on the topic, and (4) to create a space for students to come with a solid research idea for their professional career.

The course is divided into four sections. The first part reviews the main theories of electoral accountability and representation. The second part of the course is a survey of electoral institutions, focusing on the different consequences of the electoral rules. The third part of the course examines several approaches to voting behavior. The final part of the course covers several issues regarding elections in developing democracies.

## Requirements

*Participation (20%):* Each student is expected to attend each class, do the reading thoroughly and in advance, and contribute actively to our discussion. You should be prepared to be called on to describe and discuss the assigned material. Your goal should be to attend class prepared to summarize the main argument of the reading as well as to review its approach, argument, and evidence. To do so, you may need to read some items more than once.<sup>1</sup>

You must attend at least 12 of the 14 sessions. Email me ahead of time if you need an excused absence.

*Presentation (5%):* You will prepare and deliver a conference-like presentation about one of the assigned articles during the semester. I will provide more details about this activity during the first session.

*Referee Reports (3×10%=30%):* Students should pick three sessions to write a 2-3 page referee report, each focusing on an article listed under *Study* in the syllabus for a given week. These reports require discussing any shortcomings of the reading and proposing realistic and constructive ways to improve the article. Each report should summarize the main argument of the reading in the first paragraph. The rest of the report must thoroughly explain the main problems in logic or evidence of the reading. Check the folder in Blackboard with a few examples of referee reports.<sup>2</sup>

Referee reports will be submitted at the beginning of class. A student can only submit one paper per session and cannot submit a report in consecutive weeks.

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<sup>1</sup>For more guidance on how to prepare yourself for the seminar, see <http://macartan.nyc/teaching/how-to-read/> (Hat tip to Miriam Golden ([https://www.miriamgolden.com/\\_files/ugd/02c1bf\\_665009b2297f4219871bdcff7347f8f6.pdf](https://www.miriamgolden.com/_files/ugd/02c1bf_665009b2297f4219871bdcff7347f8f6.pdf)))

<sup>2</sup>For more information on how to write a peer-review, please check Miller, B., et. al. "How To Be a Peer Reviewer: A Guide for Recent and Soon-to-be PhDs" *PS: Political Science & Politics* 46(1), 120-123.

*Final Evaluation (45%):* By week 5 of the semester, students need to decide one of the two available ways to be evaluated in the class.

- *Alternative A: Annotated bibliography and take-home exam.* At the end of the semester, students will deliver an annotated bibliography together with a take-home exam. For the annotated bibliography, students must choose one of the topics listed in the syllabus. They should provide critical appraisals of at least 10 articles listed under *Recommended* or *Background*. Annotated bibliographies are not lists of sources and abstracts. Instead, they provide critical assessments of the sources selected.<sup>3</sup>

Along with the annotated bibliography, students will sit an 8-hour take-home exam. It will ask you to synthesize ideas based on the material for the class. Students will choose one question from a topic other than the one selected for the annotated bibliography. Both the annotated bibliography and take-home exam will be due on May 5.

- *Alternative B: Research Proposal.* Alternatively, students will submit a 15-page (excluding bibliography) research proposal on an original idea around the study of the elections. This assignment aims to provide you an opportunity to work on a project that can serve you as a dissertation chapter or a further publication. The proposal should contain a brief literature survey on the theme and then describe a theoretical argument and a research design to test it. We will devote time throughout the semester to discuss the different steps involved in developing a research paper. Observe that rather than offering any empirical results, you should focus on delivering an original idea and a clean and feasible research design that you can work on your own after the end of the course.<sup>4</sup>

The assignment will have the following milestones. You should have an approved research topic by February 15. There will be a 5-minute presentation of your research question and preliminary research design on March 10. The final version of the manuscript is due on May 11 at noon.

### **Course Policies**

*Electronic devices:* I encourage you to bring written notes to class summarizing the assigned reading. I also ask you to consider taking hand-notes during the seminar. There is evidence about the detrimental effects of laptops on students' performance in class.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, the use of electronic devices for activities other than class related is a very distracting behavior to others students around and myself. If you feel that your learning will be hampered by not having access to your laptop for note-taking or other legitimate purposes, please speak to me.

*Communication:* Email notifications related to this course will be sent to your UH email account.<sup>6</sup>

*Deadlines and Extensions:* Assignments submitted after the deadline will get a 10% penalty and another 10% for every additional 24-hour delay.

*Academic Integrity:* High ethical standards are critical to the integrity of any institution, and bear directly on the ultimate value of conferred degrees. All UH community members are expected to

<sup>3</sup>For more information on how to write an annotated bibliography, see <http://advice.writing.utoronto.ca/types-of-writing/annotated-bibliography/> and <https://guides.library.cornell.edu/annotatedbibliography>.

<sup>4</sup>For more information on how to write a research proposal, see <https://www.eui.eu/documents/departmentscentres/sps/profiles/schmitter/idealresearchproposal.pdf> and [https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/11041649/WritingTips\\_0720.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y](https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/11041649/WritingTips_0720.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y) (until section VI).

<sup>5</sup>See, for example, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/05/16/why-smart-kids-shouldnt-use-laptops-in-class/> and <http://thechronicleofeducation.com/2017/04/06/using-laptops-class-harms-academic-performance-study-warns/>

<sup>6</sup><https://uh.edu/infotech/services/accounts/email/>

contribute to an atmosphere of the highest possible ethical standards. Maintaining such an atmosphere requires that any instances of academic dishonesty be recognized and addressed. The UH Academic Honesty Policy is designed to handle those instances with fairness to all parties involved: the students, the instructors, and the University itself.<sup>7</sup> All students and faculty of the University of Houston are responsible for being familiar with this policy.

*Excused Absence Policy:* Regular class attendance, participation, and engagement in coursework are important contributors to student success. Absences may be excused as provided in the University of Houston Graduate Excused Absence Policy for reasons including: medical illness of student or close relative, death of a close family member, legal or government proceeding that a student is obligated to attend, recognized professional and educational activities where the student is presenting, and University-sponsored activity or athletic competition.<sup>8</sup> Under these policies, students with excused absences will be provided with an opportunity to make up any quiz, exam or other work that contributes to the course grade or a satisfactory alternative. Please read the full policy for details regarding reasons for excused absences, the approval process, and extended absences. Additional policies address absences related to military service, religious holy days, pregnancy and related conditions, and disability.

*COVID-19 Information:* Students are encouraged to visit the University's COVID-19 website for important information including diagnosis and symptom protocols, testing, vaccine information, and post-exposure guidance. Please check the website throughout the semester for updates. Consult the Graduate Excused Absence Policy for information regarding excused absences due to medical reasons.<sup>9</sup>

*Reasonable Academic Adjustments/Auxiliary Aids:* The University of Houston complies with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, pertaining to the provision of reasonable academic adjustments/auxiliary aids for disabled students. In accordance with Section 504 and ADA guidelines, UH strives to provide reasonable academic adjustments/auxiliary aids to students who request and require them. If you believe that you have a disability requiring an academic adjustments/auxiliary aid, please contact the Justin Dart Jr. Student Accessibility Center (formerly the Justin Dart, Jr. Center for Students with DisABILITIES).<sup>10</sup>

*Counseling and Psychological Services:* Counseling and Psychological Services (CAPS) can help students who are having difficulties managing stress, adjusting to college, or feeling sad and hopeless. You can reach CAPS ([www.uh.edu/caps](http://www.uh.edu/caps)) by calling 713-743-5454 during and after business hours for routine appointments or if you or someone you know is in crisis. No appointment is necessary for the "Let's Talk" program, a drop-in consultation service at convenient locations and hours around campus.<sup>11</sup>

*Title IX/Sexual Misconduct:* In accordance with the UHS Sexual Misconduct Policy, your instructor is a "responsible employee" for reporting purposes under Title IX regulations and state law and must report incidents of sexual misconduct (sexual harassment, non-consensual sexual contact, sexual assault, sexual exploitation, sexual intimidation, intimate partner violence, or stalking) about which they become aware to the Title IX office.<sup>12</sup> Please know there are places on campus where you can make a report in confidence.

*Recording of Class:* Students may not record all or part of class, livestream all or part of class, or

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<sup>7</sup><https://uh.edu/provost/policies-resources/honesty/>

<sup>8</sup><http://publications.uh.edu/content.php?catoid=45&navoid=16576>

<sup>9</sup><http://publications.uh.edu/content.php?catoid=45&navoid=16576>

<sup>10</sup><https://uh.edu/accessibility/>

<sup>11</sup>[http://www.uh.edu/caps/outreach/lets\\_talk.html](http://www.uh.edu/caps/outreach/lets_talk.html)

<sup>12</sup><https://uh.edu/equal-opportunity/title-ix-sexual-misconduct/resources/>

make/distribute screen captures, without advanced written consent of the instructor. If you have or think you may have a disability such that you need to record class-related activities, please contact the Justin Dart, Jr. Student Accessibility Center.<sup>13</sup> If you have an accommodation to record class-related activities, those recordings may not be shared with any other student, whether in this course or not, or with any other person or on any other platform. Classes may be recorded by the instructor. Students may use instructor's recordings for their own studying and note-taking. Instructor's recordings are not authorized to be shared with anyone without the prior written approval of the instructor. Failure to comply with requirements regarding recordings will result in a disciplinary referral to the Dean of Students Office and may result in disciplinary action.

*Syllabus Changes:* Due to the changing nature of the ongoing pandemic, please note that the instructor may need to make modifications to the course syllabus and may do so at any time.

### Course Materials

All the published articles are available online, and other material will be available via Blackboard. We will read most of the books listed below, so I suggest that you purchase them.

Przeworski, A. (2018). *Why Bother with Elections?* Polity.

Shugart, M. S. and Taagepera, R. (2017). *Votes from Seats*. Cambridge University Press.

The course requires a basic knowledge on econometrics and research design that (unfortunately) this graduate program does not provide. I encourage you to purchase either of the following books as a companion for the course:

Angrist, J. D. and Pischke, J.-S. (2014). *Mastering 'Metrics: The Path from Cause to Effect*. Princeton University Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, E. and Fowler, A. (2021). *Thinking Clearly with Data*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Items under *Read* are general introductions and seminal readings of the weekly topic. Items under *Study* and cutting-edge research touching on very recent extensions in the field. **Both types of readings are required for the seminar.** *Recommended* readings include articles referred to in class and other recent articles available to expand your knowledge on the topic. *Background* readings contain some seminal and related pieces on the topic .

## I. Introduction

### January 18. Seminar Motivation and Logistics

#### Read:

Przeworski, A. (2018). *Why Bother with Elections?* Polity. Chapters 1-5.

Shepsle, K. A. (2010). *Analyzing Politics*. W.W. Norton & Co. Chapter 4.

Riker, W. H. (1982a). *Liberalism Against Populism*. Waveland Press. Chapter 1.

Borges, J. L. (1975). On exactitude in science. In *A Universal History of Infamy*. Penguin Books, London

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<sup>13</sup><https://uh.edu/accessibility/>

## January 25. Electoral Accountability and Representation

### Read:

Pitkin, H. F. (1967). *The Concept of Representation*. University of California Press, Berkeley. Chapters 3-6.

Przeworski, A., Stokes, S., and Manin, B. (1999). Introduction. In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge University Press, New York. Introduction and Chapters 1.

### Study:

Carnes, N. and Lupu, N. (2015). Rethinking the comparative perspective on class and representation: Evidence from Latin America. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(1):1-18

Carreri, M. (2021). Can good politicians compensate for bad institutions? Evidence from an original survey of Italian mayors. *Journal of Politics*, 83(4):1229-1245

### Recommended:

Przeworski, A. (2018). *Why Bother with Elections?* Polity. Chapters 6-9, 12.

Klašnja, M. and Titunik, R. (2017). The incumbency curse: Weak parties, term limits, and unfulfilled accountability. *American Political Science Review*, 111(1):129-148

Motolinia, L. (2020). Electoral accountability and particularistic legislation: Evidence from an electoral reform in Mexico. *American Political Science Review*, 115(1):97-113

Dal Bó, E., Finan, F., Folke, O., Persson, T., and Rickne, J. (2017). Who becomes a politician? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 132(4):1877-1914

Sheffer, L., Lowen, P. J., Soroka, S., Walgrave, S., and Sheaffer, T. (2018). Nonrepresentative representatives: An experimental study of the decision making of elected politicians. *American Journal of Political Science*, 112(2):302-321

Adserà, A., Boix, C., and Payne, M. (2003). Are you being served? Political accountability and quality of government. *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 19(2):445-490

Mattozzi, A. and Merlo, A. (2008). Political careers or career politicians? *Journal of Public Economics*, 93(3-4):597-608

Miller, G. (2008). Women's suffrage, political responsiveness, and child survival in American history. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(3):1287-1327

Gottlieb, J. (2015). Greater expectations: A field experiment to improve accountability in Mali. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(1):143-157

Bo, E. D. and Rossi, M. (2011). Term length and the effort of politicians. *Review of Economic Studies*, 78(4):1237-1263

Lee, D. S., Moretti, E., and Butler, M. J. (2004). Do voters affect or elect policies? Evidence from the U. S. House. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(3):807-859

## Background:

- Besley, T. and Coate, S. (1997). An economic model of representative democracy. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(1):85–114
- Besley, T. (2006). *Principled Agents?* Cambridge University Press
- Fearon, J. (1999). Electoral accountability and the control of politicians. In Przeworski, A., Manin, B., and Stokes, S., editors, *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge University Press
- Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1997). Separation of powers and political accountability. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(4):1163–1202
- Ferejohn, J. (1986). Incumbent performance and electoral control. *Public Choice*, 50(1-3):5–25
- Key, V. (1966). *The Responsible Electorate*. Vintage Books
- Strøm, K. (2000). Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies. *European Journal of Political Research*, 37(3):261–290
- Chattopadhyay, R. and Duflo, E. (2004). Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in India. *Econometrica*, 72(5):1409–1443
- Huber, J. D. and Powell, B. G. (1994). Congruence between citizens and policymakers in two visions of liberal democracy. *World Politics*, 46(3):291–326
- Mayhew, D. R. (1974). Congressional elections: The case of the vanishing marginals. *Polity*, (6):295–317
- Key, V. (1966). *The Responsible Electorate*. Vintage Books
- Manin, B. (1997). *The Principle of Representative Government*. Cambridge University Press
- Barro, R. (1973). The control of politicians: An economic model. *Public Choice*, 14(1):19–42
- Iversen, T. and Rosenbluth, F. (2008). Work and power: The connection between female labor force participation and female political representation. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11:479–95
- Banks, J. S. and Sundaram, R. (1993). Adverse selection and moral hazard in a repeated elections model. In Barnett, W., Hinich, M. J., and Schiefel, N., editors, *Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Samuels, D. J. and Shugart, M. S. (2003). Presidentialism, elections and representation. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 15(1):33–60
- Drazen, A. (2000). *Political Economy in Macroeconomics*. Princeton University Press. Chapter 7

## II. Electoral Institutions

### February 1. Introduction

#### Read:

Shugart, M. S. and Taagepera, R. (2017). *Votes from Seats*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-6.

Bormann, N.-C. and Golder, M. (2022). Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946-2020. *Electoral Studies*, 78:102487

#### Study:

Gallagher, M. (1991). Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems. *Electoral Studies*, 10(1):33–51

Kedar, O., Harsgor, L., and Tuttnauer, O. (2021). Permissibility of electoral systems: A new look at an old question. *Journal of Politics*, 83(2):439–452

(This will help us understanding the material for next week:)

Taagepera, R. (2009). *Making Social Sciences More Scientific*. Oxford University Press, Oxford. pp. 120-125.

#### Recommended:

Carey, J. M. and Hix, S. (2011). The electoral sweet spot: Low-magnitude proportional electoral systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2):382–397

Calvo, E. and Rodden, J. A. (2015). The Achilles heel of plurality systems: Geography and representation in multiparty democracies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(4):789–805

Cox, G. W. (2005). Electoral institutions and party competitions. In Menard, C. and Shirley, M. M., editors, *Handbook of New Institutional Economics*. Springer

Taagepera, R. (2007). Electoral systems. In Boix, C. and Stokes, S., editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford University Press

Kedar, O., Harsgor, L., and Sheinerman, R. A. (2016). Are voters equal under proportional representation? *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(3):676–691

Dinas, E., Riera, P., and Roussias, N. (2015). Staying in the first league: Parliamentary representation and the electoral success of small parties. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 3(2):187–204

#### Background:

Reynolds, A., Reilly, B., and Ellis, A. (2005). *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm

Norris, P. (2004). *Electoral Engineering*. Cambridge University Press

Lakeman, E. and Lambert, J. (1955). *Voting in Democracies: A Study of Majority and Proportional Electoral Systems*. Faber and Faber, London

- Lijphart, A. (1994). *Electoral systems and party systems: A study of twenty-seven democracies*. Oxford University Press, Oxford
- Taagepera, R. and Shugart, M. S. (1989). *Seats and Votes*. Yale University Press, New Haven
- Bowler, S. and Grofman, B. (2000). *Elections in Australia, Ireland, and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote: Reflections on an Embedded Institution*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor
- Farrell, D. M. (2001). *Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction*. Palgrave, Houndmills
- Katz, R. S. (1997). *Democracy and Elections*. Oxford University Press, New York
- Grofman, B., S-C., L., Winckler, E., and Woodall, B., editors (1999). *Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor
- Reynolds, A. (1999). *Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa*. Oxford University Press, Oxford
- Snyder, R. and Samuels, D. J. (2004). Legislative malapportionment in Latin America: Historical and comparative perspectives. In Gibson, E. L., editor, *Federalism and Democracy in Latin America*. John Hopkins University Press
- Jones, M. (1995). A guide to the electoral systems of the Americas. *Electoral Studies*, 14(1):5–21

## February 8. The Consequences of Electoral Rules: The Inter-Party Dimension

### Read:

- Cox, G. W. (1997). *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2, 4-5.
- Shugart, M. S. and Taagepera, R. (2017). *Votes from Seats*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 7-10.

### Study:

- Lucardi, A. (2019). The effect of district magnitude on electoral outcomes. Evidence from two natural experiments in Argentina. *British Journal of Political Science*, 49(2):557–577
- Catalinac, A. and Motolinia, L. (2021). Geographically targeted spending in Mixed-Member Majoritarian electoral systems. *World Politics*, 73(4):668–711

### Recommended:

- Pons, V. and Tricaud, C. (2018). Expressive voting and its costs: Evidence from runoffs with two or three candidates. *Econometrica*, 86(5):1621–1649
- Potter, J. D. (2018). Constituency diversity, district magnitude and voter co-ordination. *British Journal of Political Science*, 48(1):91–113
- Blais, A., Lachat, R., Hino, A., and Doray-Demers, P. (2011). The mechanical and psychological effects of electoral systems: A quasi-experimental study. *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(12):1599–1621



- Artabe, A. and Gardeazabal, J. (2014). Strategic votes and sincere counterfactuals. *Political Analysis*, 22(2):243–257
- Meirowitz, A. (2005). Polling games and informations transmission. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 51:464–89
- Cox, G. W. and Shugart, M. S. (1996). Strategic voting under proportional representation. *Journal of Law Economics and Organization*, 12(2):299–324
- Carey, J. M. and Hix, S. (2011). The electoral sweet spot: Low-magnitude proportional electoral systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2):382–397
- Kam, C., Bertelli, A. M., and Held, A. (2020). The electoral system, the party system and accountability in parliamentary government. *American Political Science Review*, 114(3):744–760
- Becher, M. and Menéndez González, I. (2019). Electoral reform and trade-offs in representation. *American Political Science Review*, 113(3):694–709

### **Background:**

- Duverger, M. (1954). *Political Parties*. Wiley, New York. Book II, Chapter 1
- Riker, W. H. (1982b). The two-party system and Duverger’s law: An essay on the history of political science. *American Political Science Review*, 76(4):753–766
- Chhibber, P. and Kollman, K. (1998). Party aggregation and the number of parties in India and the United States. *The American Political Science Review*, 92(2):329–342
- Crisp, B. F., Olivella, S., and Potter, J. D. (2012). Electoral contexts that impede voter coordination. *Electoral Studies*, (31):143–158
- Blais, A., Lachat, R., Hino, A., and Doray-Demers, P. (2011). The mechanical and psychological effects of electoral systems: A quasi-experimental study. *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(12):1599–1621
- Alvarez, R. M., Boehmke, F. J., and Nagler, J. (2006). Strategic voting in British elections. *Electoral Studies*, 25(1):1–19
- Cox, G. W. and Shugart, M. S. (1996). Strategic voting under proportional representation. *Journal of Law Economics and Organization*, 12(2):299–324
- Moser, R. G. and Scheiner, E. (2012). *Electoral Systems and Political Context: How the Effects of Rules Vary Across New and Established Democracies*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Palfrey, T. and Rosenthal, H. (1985). Voter participation and strategic uncertainty. *American Political Science Review*, 79:62–78
- Blais, A., Nadeau, R., Gidengil, E., and Nevitte, N. (2001). Measuring strategic voting in multiparty plurality elections. *Electoral Studies*, pages 343–352
- Alvarez, R. M. and Nagler, J. (2000). A new approach for modelling strategic voting in multiparty elections. *British Journal of Political Science*, 30(1):pp. 57–75
- Gibbard, A. (1973). Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. *Econometrica*, 41:587–601

- Meirowitz, A. and Tucker, J. A. (2007). Run boris run: Strategic voting in sequential elections. *The Journal of Politics*, 69(1):88–99
- Piketty, T. (2000). Voting as communicating. *Review of Economic Studies*, 67(1):169–91
- Spenkuch, J. L. (2014). Please don't vote for me: Voting in a natural experiment with perverse incentives. *The Economic Journal*, 125:1025–1052
- Li, Y. and Shugart, M. S. (2016). The seat product model of the effective number of parties: A case for applied political science. *Electoral Studies*, 41:23–34

## February 15. The Consequences of Electoral Rules II: The Intra-Party Dimension

### Read:

- Passarelli, G. (2020). *Preferential Voting Systems*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. Chapters 1 [skip section 1.5], 4 [selected country cases], and 5.
- Shugart, M. S., Bergman, M. E., Struthers, C. L., Krauss, E. S., and Pekkanen, R. J. (2021). *Party Personnel Strategies: Electoral Systems and Parliamentary Committee Assignments*. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Chapters 1-3.

### Study:

- Crisp, B. F., Schneider, B., Catalinac, A., and Muraoka, T. (2021). Capturing vote-seeking incentives and the cultivation of a personal and party vote. *Electoral Studies*, 72:102369
- Cheibub, J. A. and Sin, G. (2020). Preference vote and intra-party competition in Open List PR systems. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 32(1):70–95

### Recommended:

- Shugart, M. S. and Taagepera, R. (2017). *Votes from Seats*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 13-14.
- Blumenau, J., Eggers, A. C., Hangartner, D., and Hix, S. (2017). Open/closed list and party choice: Experimental evidence from the U.K. *British Journal of Political Science*, 47(4):809–827
- Catalinac, A. (2018). Positioning under alternative electoral systems: Evidence from Japanese candidate election manifestos. *American Political Science Review*, 112(1):31–48
- Carey, J. M. (2007). Competing principals, political institutions, and party unity in legislative voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1):92–107
- Iversen, T. and Soskice, D. (2006). Electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions: Why some democracies redistribute more than others. *American Political Science Review*, 100(2):165–82
- Beath, A., Christia, F., Egorov, G., and Enikolopov, R. (2016). Electoral rules and political selection: Theory and evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan. *Review of Economic Studies*, 83:932–968
- Desposato, S. W. (2006). The impact of electoral rules on legislative parties: Lessons from the Brazilian senate and chamber of deputies. *Journal of Politics*, 68(4):1018–1030

- Moser, R. G. and Scheiner, E. (2012). *Electoral Systems and Political Context: How the Effects of Rules Vary Across New and Established Democracies*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Chapters 1 and 8
- Calvo, E. and Hellwig, T. (2011). Centripetal and centrifugal incentives under different electoral systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(1):27–41
- Rickard, S. J. (2012). Electoral systems, voters' interests and geographic dispersion. *British Journal of Political Science*, 42(4):855–877
- Sudulich, L. and Trumm, S. (2019). A comparative study of the effects of electoral institutions on campaigns. *British Journal of Political Science*, 49(1):381–399
- Jurado, I. and León, S. (2019). Geography matters: The conditional effect of electoral systems on social spending. *British Journal of Political Science*, 49(1):81–103

### **Background:**

- Rae, D. (1971). *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. Yale University Press, New Haven
- Katz, R. S. (1986). Intrapreference party voting. In Grofman, B. and Lijphart, A., editors, *Electoral laws and their political consequences*, pages 85–103. Agathon Press, New York
- Cox, G. W. (1990). Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 34(4):903–936
- Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2003). *The Economic Effect of Constitutions*. MIT Press
- Powell, B. G. (2009). The ideological congruence controversy. *Comparative Political Studies*, 42:1475–1497
- Katz, R. S. (1986). Intrapreference party voting. In Grofman, B. and Lijphart, A., editors, *Electoral laws and their political consequences*, pages 85–103. Agathon Press, New York
- Grofman, B. and Lijphart, A., editors (1984). *Electoral laws and their political consequences*. Agathon Press, New York
- Amorim Neto, O. and Cox, G. W. (1997). Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 41(1):149–174
- Cox, G. W. (1988). Electoral rules and the calculus of mobilization
- Manow, P. (2009). Electoral rules, class coalitions and welfare state regimes, or how to explain esping-andersen with stein rokkan. *Socio-Economic Review*, 1(101-121)
- Naoi, M. and Krauss, E. (2008). Who lobbies whom? Electoral systems and organized interests' choice of bureaucrats vs. politicians in Japan
- Ames, B. (1995). Electoral strategy under open-list proportional representation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 39(2):406–433
- Austen-Smith, D. and Banks, J. S. (1988). Elections, coalitions, and legislative outcomes. *The American Political Science Review*, 82(2)
- Samuels, D. J. (1999). Incentives to cultivate a party vote in candidate-centric systems: evidence from Brazil. *Comparative Political Studies*, 32:487–518

- Ardanaz, M. and Scartascini, C. (2013). Inequality and Personal Income Taxation: The Origins and Effects of Legislative Malapportionment. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(12):1638–1663
- Edwards, M. S. and Thames, F. C. (2007). District magnitude, personal votes, and government expenditures. *Electoral Studies*, 26(2):338 – 345
- Rogowski, R. and Kayser, M. A. (2002). Majoritarian electoral systems and consumer power: Price-level evidence from the OECD countries. *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(3):526–539
- Morgenstern, S. and Vázquez-D’Elía, J. (2007). Electoral laws, parties, and party systems in Latin America. *Annual Review of Political Science*, (10):143–68
- Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2007). Electoral systems and economic policy. In Weingast, B. W. and Wittman, D. A., editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Oxford University Press
- Myerson, R. B. (1993). Incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems. *The American Political Science Review*, 87(4):856–869
- Osborne, M. J. and Slivinski, A. (1996). A model of political competition with citizen-candidates. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 111(1):65–96

## February 22. Electoral Reforms

### Read:

- Colomer, J. M. (2004). The strategy and history of electoral system choice. In *Handbook of Electoral System Choice*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York
- Rokkan, S. (1970[2009]). *Citizens, Elections, Parties*. ECPR Press. Pages 147-168.

### Study:

- Schröder, V. and Manow, P. (2020). An intra-party account of electoral system choice. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 8:251–267
- Cox, G. W., Fiva, J. H., and Smith, D. M. (2019). Parties, legislators, and the origins of proportional representation. *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(1):102–133

### Recommended:

- Negretto, G. L. and Visconti, G. (2018). Electoral reform under limited party competition: The adoption of proportional representation in Latin America. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 60(1):27–51
- Calvo, E. (2009). The competitive road to Proportional Representation: Partisan biases and electoral regime change under increasing party competition. *World Politics*, 61(2)
- Leeman, L. and Mares, I. (2014). The adoption of proportional representation. *Journal of Politics*, 76(2):461–478
- Renwick, A. and Pilet, J.-B. (2016). *Faces on the Ballot: The Personalization of Electoral Systems in Europe*. Oxford University Press. Chapters 2 and 4

**Background:**

- Shugart, M. S. (2008). Inherent and contingent factors in reform initiation in plurality systems. In Blais, A., editor, *To Keep or To Change First Past The Post? The Politics of Electoral Reform*, pages 7–60. Oxford University Press
- Katz, R. S. (2005). Why are there so many (or so few) electoral reforms? In Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P., editors, *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, pages 57–76. Oxford University Press, New York
- Blais, A., editor (2008). *To Keep or to Change first Past the Post? The Politics of Electoral Reform*. Oxford University Press, New York
- Benoit, K. (2004). Models of electoral system change. *Electoral Studies*, 23(3):363–89
- Boix, C. (1999). Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 93(3)
- Cusak, T., Iversen, T., and Soskice, D. (2007). Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems. *American Political Science Review*, 101(3):373–391
- Przeworski, A. (2008). Conquered or granted? a history of suffrage extensions. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(2):291–321
- Blais, A., Dobrzynska, A., and Indridason, I. H. (2004). To adopt or not to adopt proportional representational: The politics of institutional choice. *British Journal of Political Science*, 35:182–190
- Andrews, J. T. and Jackman, R. W. (2005). Strategic fools: electoral rule choice under extreme uncertainty. *Electoral Studies*, (24):65–84

### III. Voting Behavior

#### March 1. Existing Approaches

**Read:**

- Downs, A. (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Harper & Row Publishers. Chapters 3, 8, 11-12.
- Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 69(1):99–118

**Study:**

- Lawson, C., Lenz, G. S., Baker, A., and Myers, M. (2010). Looking like a winner: Candidate appearance and electoral success in new democracies. *World Politics*, 62(4):561–593
- Sorace, M. and Binzer Hobolt, S. (2021). A tale of two peoples: Motivated reasoning in the aftermath of the Brexit vote. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 9:675–692

**Recommended:**

- Kedar, O. (2005). When moderate voters prefer extreme parties: Policy balancing in parliamentary elections. *American Political Science Review*, 99(2):185–199
- Johns, R. and Kölln, A.-K. (2020). Moderation and competence: How a party’s ideological position shapes its valence reputation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 64:649–663
- Muraoka, T. and Rosas, G. (2021). Does economic inequality drive voters’ disagreement about party placement? *American Journal of Political Science*, 65(3):582–597
- Bisgaard, M. (2015). Bias will find a way: Economic perceptions, attributions of blame, and partisan-motivated reasoning during crisis. *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 77(3):849–860
- Iversen, T. (1994b). Political leadership and representation in West European democracies: A test of three models of voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 38(1):45–74
- Lachat, R. (2015). The role of party identification in spatial models of voting choice. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 3(3):641–658
- Franchino, F. and Zucchini, F. (2015). Voting in a multi-dimensional space: A conjoint analysis employing valence and ideology attributes of candidates. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 3(2):221–241
- Calvo, E. and Murillo, M. V. (2019). *Non-Policy Politics*. Cambridge University Press, New York
- Grewal, S., Jamal, A. A., Masoud, T., and Nugent, E. R. (2019). Poverty and divine rewards: The electoral advantage of Islamist political parties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 63:859–874

**Background:**

- Adams, J. F., Merrill III, S., and Grofman, B. (2005). *A Unified Theory of Party Competition: A Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors*. Cambridge University Press, New York
- Westholm, A. (1997). Distance vs. direction: The illusory defeat of the proximity theory of electoral choice. *American Journal of Political Science*, 91(4):865–885
- Lewis, J. B. (2001). Estimating voter preference distributions from individual-level voting data. *Political Analysis*, 9(3):275–297
- Tomz, M. and Houweling, R. P. V. (2008). Candidate positioning and voter choice. *American Political Science Review*, 102(3):303–318
- Alesina, A. (1988). Credibility and policy convergence in a two-party system with rational voters. *The American Economic Review*, 78(4):796–805
- Adams, J. F., Merrill, S., and Grofman, B. (1999). *A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Rivers, D. (1988). Heterogeneity in models of electoral choice. *American Journal of Political Science*, 32(737-57)

Iversen, T. (1994a). The logics of electoral politics: Spatial, directional, and mobilizational effects. *Comparative Political Studies*, 27(21):55–189

Rabinowitz, G. and Macdonald, S. E. (1989). A directional theory of issue voting. *American Political Science Review*, 83(1):93–121

Duch, R. M. and Stevenson, R. T. (2010). The global economy, competency, and the economic vote. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(1):195–123

Kayser, M. A. and Wlezien, C. (2005). Performance pressure: Patterns of partisanship and the economic vote. *European Journal of Political Research*, 3(365-94)

Anderson, C. J. (2000). Economic voting and political context: A comparative perspective. *Electoral Studies*, 19(2-3):183–97

## March 8. Contextual Factors

### Read:

Bruter, M. and Harrison, S. (2020). *Inside the Mind of a Voter*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Chapters 2-4.

### Study:

Cantoni, E. and Pons, V. (2022). Does context outweigh individual characteristics in driving voting behavior? Evidence from relocations within the United States. *American Economic Review*, 112(4):1226–1272

Valentim, V. (2021). Parliamentary representation and the normalization of radical right support. *Comparative Political Studies*, 54(14):2475–2511

Hoffmann, R., Muttarak, R., Peisker, J., and Staning, P. (2022). Climate change experiences raise environmental concerns and promote Green voting. *Nature Climate Change*, 12:148–155

## March 22. Identity Voting

### Read:

Przeworski, A. and Sprague, J. (1986). *Paper Stones*. The University of Chicago Press. Chapters 1-3.

Chandra, K. (2004). *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2-4

### Study:

Portmann, L. (2022). Do stereotypes explain discrimination against minority candidates or discrimination in favor of majority candidates? *British Journal of Political Science*, 52:501–519

Arriola, L., Choi, D. D., and Gichohi, M. K. (2022). Increasing intergroup trust: Endorsements and voting in divided societies. *Journal of Politics*, 84(4):2107–2122

**Recommended:**

- Huber, J. D. and Suryanarayan, P. (2016). Ethnic inequality and the ethnification of political parties: Evidence from India. *World Politics*, 68(1):148–188
- Klar, S. (2019). When common identities decrease trust: An experimental study of partisan women. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62:610–622
- Greene, S. (1999). Understanding party identification: A social identity approach. *Political Psychology*, 20(2):393–403
- Reilly, B. (2001). *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management*. Cambridge University Press
- Michelitch, K. (2015). Does electoral competition exacerbate interethnic or interpartisan economic discrimination? *American Political Science Review*, 109(1):43–61
- Ben-Bassat, A. and Dahan, M. (2012). Social identity and voting behavior. *Public Choice*, 151:193–214
- Holli, A. M. and Wass, H. (2010). Gender-based voting in the parliamentary elections of 2007 in Finland. *European Journal of Political Research*, 49(5):598–630
- Houle, C., Kenny, P. D., and Park, C. (2018). The structure of ethnic inequality and ethnic voting. *Journal of Politics*, 81(1):187–200
- Piketty, T. (2020). *Capital and Ideology*. Harvard University Press. Chapter 14

**Background:**

- Geertz, C. (1973). *The Interpretations of Culture*. Basic Books
- Horowitz, D. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. University of California Press, Berkeley
- Horowitz, D. L. (2002). Constitutional design: proposals versus processes. *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*, pages 15–36
- Wilkinson, S. I. (2004). *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Abrajano, M. A. and Alvarez, R. M. (2005). A natural experiment of race-based and issue voting: The 2001 City of Los Angeles elections. *Political Research Quarterly*, 58(2):203–218
- Chauchard, S. (2014). Can descriptive representation change beliefs about a stigmatized group? Evidence from rural India. *American Political Science Review*, 108(2):403–422
- Ferree, K. (2006). Explaining South Africa's racial census. *Journal of Politics*, 68(4):803–815
- Conroy-Krutz, J. (2013). Information and ethnic politics in Africa. *British Journal of Political Science*, 43(2):345–373
- Eifert, B., Miguel, T., and Posner, D. (2010). Political competition and ethnic identification in Africa. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(2):494–510



Dunning, T. and Harrison, L. (2010). Cross-cutting cleavages and ethnic voting: An experimental study of cousinage in Mali. *American Political Science Review*, 104(1):1–19

Casey, K. (2015). Crossing party lines: The effects of information on redistributive politics. *American Economic Review*, 105(6):2410–2448

Adida, C., Gottlieb, J., Kramon, E., and McClendon, G. (2017). Reducing or reinforcing in-group preferences? an experiment on information and ethnic voting. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 12:437–477

Ansolabehere, S. and Puy, M. S. (2019). Identity voting. *Public Choice*, 169:77–95

## March 29. Information

### Read:

Pande, R. (2011). Can informed voters enforce better governance? Experiments in low-income democracies. *Annual Review of Economics*, 3:215–37

Dunning, T., Grossman, G., Humphreys, M., Hyde, S. D., McIntosh, C., Nellis, G., Adida, C. L., Arias, E., Bicalho, C., Boas, T. C., Buntaine, M. T., Chauchard, S., Chowdhury, A., Gottlieb, J., Hidalgo, F. D., Holmlund, M., Jablonski, R., Kramon, E., Larreguy, H., Lierl, M., Marshall, J., McClendon, G., Melo, M. A., Nielson, D. L., Pickering, P. M., Platas, M. R., Querubín, P., Raffler, P., and Sircar, N. (2019). Voter information campaigns and political accountability: Cumulative findings from a preregistered meta-analysis of coordinated trials. *Science Advances*, 5(7)

### Study:

Peisakhin, L. and Rozenas, A. (2018). Electoral effects of biased media: Russian television in Ukraine. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62:535–550

Foos, F. and Bischof, D. (2022). Tabloid media campaigns and public opinion: Quasi-experimental evidence on Euroscepticism in England. *American Political Science Review*, 116(1):19–37

### Recommended:

Kartal, M. and Tyran, J.-R. (2022). Fake news, voter overconfidence and the quality of democratic choice. *American Economic Review*, 112(10):3367–3397

Lau, R. R., Patel, P., Fahmy, D. F., and Kaufman, R. R. (2014). Correct voting across thirty-three democracies: A preliminary analysis. *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(2):239–259

Lupia, A. (2015). *Uninformed*. Oxford University Press

Alvarez, R. M. (1997). *Information and Elections*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor

Grossman, G. and Michelitch, K. (2018). Information dissemination, competitive pressure, and politician performance between elections." *American Political Science Review*, 112(2):280–301

- Ferraz, C. and Finan, F. (2008). Exposing corrupt politicians: The effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(2):703–745
- Enikopolov, R., Petrieva, M., and Zhuravskaya, E. (2011). Media and political persuasion: Evidence from Russia. *American Economic Review*, 101(7):3253–85
- Conroy-Krutz, J. and Moehler, D. C. (2015). Moderation from bias: A field experiment on partisan media in a new democracy. *Journal of Politics*, 77(2):575–587
- DellaVigna, S. and Kaplan, E. (2007). The Fox News effect: Media bias and voting. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(3):1187–1234

### Background:

- Lupia, A. and McCubbins, M. (1998). *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?* Cambridge University Press
- Lupia, A., Levine, A. S., Menning, J. O., and Sin, G. (2007). Were Bush tax cut supporters “simply ignorant?” A second look at conservatives and liberals in “Homer gets a tax cut”. *Perspectives on Politics*, (4):773–784
- Besley, T. and Burgess, R. (2002). The political economy of government responsiveness: Theory and evidence from India. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4)
- Kendall, C., Nannicini, T., and Trebbi, F. (2016). How do voters respond to information? Evidence from a randomized campaign. *American Economic Review*, 105(1):322–353
- Adams, J., Ezrow, L., and Somer-Topcu, Z. (2014). Do voters respond to party manifestos or to a wider information environment? an analysis of mass-elite linkages on european integration. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(4):967–978
- Arceneaux, K. and Johnson, M. (2013). *Changing Minds or Changing Channels?* The University of Chicago Press
- Aalberg, T., Papathanassopoulos, S., Soroka, S., Curran, J., Hayashi, K., Iyengar, S., Jones, P. K., Mazzoleni, G., Rojas, H., Rowe, D., and Tiffen, R. (14). International TV news, foreign affairs interest and public knowledge. *Journalism Studies*, 3(387-406)
- Van Aelst, P., Strömbäck, J., Aalberg, T., Esser, F., de Vreese, C., Matthes, J., Hopmann, D., Salgado, S., Hubé, N., Stepińska, A., Papathanassopoulos, S., Berganza, R., Legnante, G., Reinemann, C., Sheaffer, T., and Stanyer, J. (2017). Political communication in a high-choice media environment: a challenge for democracy? *Annals of the International Communication Association*, 41(1):3–27
- McDonald Ladd, J. and Lenz, G. S. (2009). Exploiting a rare communication shift to document the persuasive power of the news media. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2):394–410
- Snyder, J. M. and Strömberg, D. (2010). Press coverage and political accountability. *Journal of Political Economy*, 118(2):355–408
- Vavreck, L. (2007). The exaggerated effects of advertising on turnout: The dangers of self-reports. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 2(4):325–343
- Gerber, A. S., Karlan, D., and Bergan, D. (2009). Does the media matter? A field experiment measuring the effect of newspapers on voting behavior and political opinions. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 1(2):35–52
- Boas, T. C. and Hidalgo, F. D. (2011). Controlling the airwaves: Incumbency advantage and community radio in Brazil. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(4):869–885

## IV. Topics in Elections

### April 5. Elections in Dictatorships

#### Read:

Hermet, G. (1978). State-controlled elections: A framework. In Hermet, G., Rose, R., and Rouquié, A., editors, *Elections without choice*, pages 1–18. The Macmillan Press LTD, london edition

Blaydes, L. A. (2011). *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. Cambridge University Press, New York. Chapters 1-3

#### Study:

Martinez Bravo, M., Padró i Miquel, G., Qian, N., and Yao, Y. (2022). The rise and fall of local elections in China. *American Economic Review*, 112(9):2921–2958

Lueders, H. (2022). Electoral responsiveness in closed autocracies: Evidence from petitions in the former German Democratic Republic. *American Political Science Review*, 116(3):827–842

#### Recommended:

Cox, G. W. (2009). Authoritarian elections and leadership succession, 1975-2000. Working Paper

Gandhi, J. and Lust-Okar, E. (2009). Elections under authoritarianism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, (12):403–422

Svolik, M. W. (2012). *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press

Gandhi, J. and Ong, E. (2019). Committed or conditional democrats? Opposition dynamics in electoral autocracies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 63:948–963

Dinas, E. and Northmore-Ball, K. (2020). The ideological shadow of authoritarianism. *Comparative Political Studies*, 53(12):1957–1991

#### Background:

Geddes, B. and Zaller, J. (1989). Sources of popular support for authoritarian regimes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 33(2):319–347

Lust-Okar, E. (2005). *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World. Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions*. Cambridge University Press, New York

Schedler, A. (2013). *The Politics of Uncertainty*. Oxford University Press, New York

Magaloni, B. (2006). *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge University Press, New York

Gandhi, J. (2014). The role of presidential power in authoritarian elections. In Ginsburg, T. and Simpser, A., editors, *Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes*. Cambridge University Press

Malesky, E. J. and Schuler, P. (2011). The single-party dictator's dilemma: Information in elections without opposition. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 36(4):491–530

Posada-Carbó, E., editor (1996). *Elections before Democracy: The History of Elections in Europe and Latin America*. Macmillan Press LTD, London

Levitsky, S. and Way, L. A. (2010). *Competitive Authoritarianism*. Cambridge University Press, New York

Boix, C. and Svolik, M. W. (2013). The foundations of limited authoritarian government: Institutions, commitment, and power-sharing in dictatorships. *Journal of Politics*, 75(2):300–316

Reuter, O. J. and Robertson, G. B. (2012). Subnational appointments in authoritarian regimes: Evidence from russian gubernatorial appointments. *The Journal of Politics*, 74(4):1023–1037

Croke, K., Grossman, G., Larreguy, H., and Marshall, J. (2016). Deliberate disengagement: How education can decrease political participation in electoral authoritarian regimes. *American Political Science Review*, 110(3):579–600

Hale, H. E. and Colton, T. J. (2017). Who defects? unpacking a defection cascade from russia's dominant party 2008-12. *American Political Science Review*, 11(2):322–337

## April 12. Clientelism

### Read:

Stokes, S., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M., and Brusco, V. (2013). *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism*. Cambridge University Press, New York. Chapters 1 and 2.

Oliveros, V. (2021). *Patronage at Work*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Chapters 1 and 2.

### Study:

Auerbach, A. M. and Thachil, T. (2020). Cultivating clients: Reputation, responsiveness, and ethnic indifference in India's slums. *American Journal of Political Science*, 64(3):471–497

Brierley, S. and Nathan, N. L. (2022). Motivating the machine: Which brokers do parties pay? *Journal of Politics*, 84(3)

### Recommended:

Calvo, E. and Murillo, M. V. (2013). When parties meet voters: Assessing political linkages through partisan networks and distributive expectations in Argentina and Chile. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(7):851–882

Stokes, S. (2005). Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. *American Political Science Review*, 99(03):315–325

Nichter, S. (2014). Conceptualizing vote buying. *Electoral Studies*, 35:315–327

Cruz, C., Labonne, J., and Querubín, P. (2017). Politician family networks and electoral outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines. *American Economic Review*, 107(10):3006–3037

- Gonzalez-Ocantos, E., Kiewiet de Jonge, C., and Nickerson, D. W. (2014). The conditionality of vote-buying norms: Experimental evidence from Latin America. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(1):197–211
- Gans-Morse, J., Mazzuca, S., and Nichter, S. (2014). Varieties of clientelism: Machine politics during elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(2):415–432
- Larreguy, H., Marshall, J., and Querubin, P. (2016). Parties, brokers and voter mobilization: How turnout buying depends upon the party's capacity to monitor brokers. *American Political Science Review*, 10(1):160–179
- Szwarcberg, M. (2013). The microfoundations of political clientelism: Lessons from the Argentine case. *Latin American Research Review*, 48(2):32–54
- Nichter, S. (2018). *Surviving Politics*. Cambridge University Press
- Mares, I. and Young, L. E. (Forthcoming). The core voter's curse: Clientelistic threats and promises in Hungarian elections. *Comparative Political Studies*

### **Background:**

- Calvo, E. and Murillo, M. V. (2004). Who delivers? partisan clients in the Argentine electoral market. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(4):742–757
- Cox, G. W. and McCubbins, M. D. (1986). Electoral politics as a redistributive game. *The Journal of Politics*, 48(2):370–389
- Dixit, A. and Londregan, J. (1996). The determinants of success of special interests in redistributive politics. *The Journal of Politics*, 58(4):1132–1155
- Gonzalez-Ocantos, E., Kiewiet de Jonge, C., Melendez, C., Osorio, J., and Nickerson, D. W. (2012). Vote buying and social desirability bias: Experimental evidence from Nicaragua. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(1):202–217
- Nichter, S. (2008). Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret ballot. *American Political Science Review*, 102(1):19–31
- Albertus, M. (2013). Vote buying with multiple distributive goods. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(9):1082–1111
- Vicente, P. C. and Wantchekon, L. (2009). Clientelism and vote buying: lessons from field experiments in African elections. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 25(2):292–305
- Weitz-Shapiro, R. (2012). What wins votes: Why some politicians opt out of clientelism. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(3):568–583
- Finan, F. and Schechter, L. (2012). Vote-buying and reciprocity. *Econometrica*, 80(2):863–881
- Wantchekon, L. (2003). Clientelism and voting behavior. evidence from a field experiment in Benin. *World Politics*, (55):399–422
- Cox, G. W. (2010). Swing voters, core voters and distributive politics. In Shapiro, I., Stokes, S. C., Wood, E. J., and Krshner, A. S., editors, *Political Representation*, pages 342–357. Cambridge University Press

## April 19. Electoral Integrity

### Read:

Birch, S. (2012). *Electoral Malpractice*. Oxford University Press, New York. Chapters 1-3

Simpser, A. (2013). *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications*. Cambridge University Press, New York. Chapters 2-3.

### Read:

Garbiras-Díaz, N. and Montenegro, M. (2022). All eyes on them: A field experiment on citizen oversight and electoral integrity. *American Economic Review*, 112(8):2631–2668

Idrobo, N., Kronick, D., and Rodriguez, F. (2022). Do shifts in late-counted votes signal fraud? Evidence from Bolivia. *Journal of Politics*, 84(4):2202–2215

### Recommended:

Callen, M. and Long, J. D. (2015). Institutional corruption and election fraud: Evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan. *American Economic Review*, 105(1):354–381

Rundlett, A. and Svolik, M. W. (2016). Deliver the vote! micromotives and macrobehavior in electoral fraud. *American Political Science Review*, 10(1):180–197

Mares, I. (2015). *From Open Secrets to Secret Voting: The Adoption of Electoral Reforms Protecting Voters Against Electoral Intimidation*. Cambridge University Press, New York

Ofori, G. K. (2019). Do fairer elections increase the responsiveness of politicians? *American Political Science Review*, 113(4):963–979

Rueda, M. R. and Ruiz, N. A. (2020). Political agency, election quality, and corruption. *Journal of Politics*, 82(4):1256–1270

Fukumoro, K. and Horiuchi, Y. (2011). Making outsiders' votes count: Detecting electoral fraud through a natural experiment. *American Political Science Review*, 105(3):583–603

Martinez Bravo, M. (2014). The role of local officials in new democracies: Evidence from indonesia. *American Economic Review*, 104(4):1244–1287

### Background:

Norris, P. (2014). *Why Electoral Integrity Matters*. Cambridge University Press

Mebane, W. R. (2015). Election forensics toolkit. DRG Center Working Paper

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